Add aarch64_efi target: wolfBoot as an AArch64 UEFI application

pull/850/head
David Garske 2026-07-09 11:32:12 -07:00 committed by Daniele Lacamera
parent 0dfad2dbc1
commit 34941079e1
14 changed files with 961 additions and 4 deletions

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@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ on:
make-args:
required: false
type: string
prep-run:
required: false
type: string
jobs:
@ -42,6 +45,10 @@ jobs:
run: |
make -C tools/keytools && make -C tools/bin-assemble
- name: Pre-build setup
if: inputs.prep-run != ''
run: ${{inputs.prep-run}}
- name: Build wolfboot
run: |
make ${{inputs.make-args}}

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@ -764,6 +764,14 @@ jobs:
arch: host
config-file: ./config/examples/x86_64_efi.config
aarch64_efi_test:
uses: ./.github/workflows/test-build.yml
with:
arch: aarch64
config-file: ./config/examples/aarch64_efi.config
# Build gnu-efi for aarch64 (pinned in the script) before wolfboot.efi.
prep-run: ./tools/scripts/build-gnu-efi-aarch64.sh
zynqmp_test:
uses: ./.github/workflows/test-build-aarch64.yml
with:

8
.gitignore vendored
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@ -427,3 +427,11 @@ port/stmicro/stm32h5-tz-wolfhsm/out/
# CI-only generated Libero settings stub (see tools/ci/gen_mpfs_libero_stub.sh)
tools/ci/mpfs_libero_stub/
# gnu-efi built for the AArch64 UEFI target and its cloned source
tools/gnu-efi-aarch64/
tools/gnu-efi-src/
# aarch64_efi working/staging dirs (build artifacts, not tracked)
aarch64_efi-stage/
tools/qemu-esp/
# UEFI Secure Boot keys/certs generated by tools/scripts/sign-efi-secureboot.sh
tools/efi-secureboot-keys/

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@ -313,6 +313,9 @@ SIGN_ENV=IMAGE_HEADER_SIZE=$(IMAGE_HEADER_SIZE) \
MAIN_TARGET=factory.bin
# PE/COFF output format for the wolfboot.efi objcopy rule. Overridden per
# target in arch.mk (e.g. pei-aarch64-little for aarch64_efi).
EFI_OBJCOPY_TARGET?=pei-x86-64
TARGET_H_TEMPLATE:=include/target.h.in
ifeq ($(TZEN),1)
@ -345,6 +348,10 @@ ifeq ($(TARGET),x86_64_efi)
MAIN_TARGET:=wolfboot.efi
endif
ifeq ($(TARGET),aarch64_efi)
MAIN_TARGET:=wolfboot.efi
endif
ifeq ($(FSP), 1)
MAIN_TARGET:=wolfboot_stage1.bin
endif
@ -431,7 +438,7 @@ wolfboot.efi: wolfboot.elf
$(Q)$(OBJCOPY) -j .rodata -j .text -j .sdata -j .data \
-j .dynamic -j .dynsym -j .rel \
-j .rela -j .reloc -j .eh_frame \
-O pei-x86-64 --subsystem=10 $^ $@
-O $(EFI_OBJCOPY_TARGET) --subsystem=10 $^ $@
@echo
@echo "\t[SIZE]"
$(Q)$(SIZE) wolfboot.efi

60
arch.mk
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@ -63,9 +63,20 @@ endif
## ARM Cortex-A
ifeq ($(ARCH),AARCH64)
CROSS_COMPILE?=aarch64-none-elf-
ifeq ($(TARGET),aarch64_efi)
# UEFI app: Linux GNU toolchain (freestanding EFI ABI), not aarch64-none-elf-
CROSS_COMPILE?=aarch64-linux-gnu-
else
CROSS_COMPILE?=aarch64-none-elf-
endif
CFLAGS+=-DARCH_AARCH64 -DFAST_MEMCPY
OBJS+=src/boot_aarch64.o src/boot_aarch64_start.o
ifeq ($(TARGET),aarch64_efi)
# UEFI app: gnu-efi CRT0 is the entry; do_boot is in boot_aarch64_efi.o.
# Skip the bare-metal reset (boot_aarch64_start.S) and EL2/GIC glue.
OBJS+=src/boot_aarch64_efi.o
else
OBJS+=src/boot_aarch64.o src/boot_aarch64_start.o
endif
ifeq ($(TARGET),zynq)
ARCH_FLAGS=-march=armv8-a+crypto
@ -1933,6 +1944,37 @@ ifeq ($(TARGET),x86_64_efi)
UPDATE_OBJS:=src/update_ram.o
endif
ifeq ($(TARGET),aarch64_efi)
# Generic AArch64 UEFI application (validated on NVIDIA Jetson Orin Nano).
# Build gnu-efi for aarch64 first: ./tools/scripts/build-gnu-efi-aarch64.sh
# (override the install path with GNU_EFI_PATH=... if needed).
USE_GCC_HEADLESS=0
GNU_EFI_PATH?=tools/gnu-efi-aarch64
GNU_EFI_LIB_PATH?=$(GNU_EFI_PATH)/lib
GNU_EFI_INC_PATH?=$(GNU_EFI_PATH)/include
GNU_EFI_CRT0=$(GNU_EFI_LIB_PATH)/crt0-efi-aarch64.o
GNU_EFI_LSCRIPT=$(GNU_EFI_LIB_PATH)/elf_aarch64_efi.lds
CFLAGS += -fpic -ffreestanding -fno-stack-protector -fno-stack-check \
-fshort-wchar -mstrict-align
CFLAGS += -I$(GNU_EFI_INC_PATH) -I$(GNU_EFI_INC_PATH)/efi \
-I$(GNU_EFI_INC_PATH)/efi/aarch64 \
-DTARGET_aarch64_efi -DWOLFBOOT_DUALBOOT
# avoid using of fixed LOAD_ADDRESS, uefi target uses dynamic location
CFLAGS += -DWOLFBOOT_NO_LOAD_ADDRESS
# AArch64 PE/COFF output format for objcopy (see the wolfboot.efi rule).
# This binutils exposes it as pei-aarch64-little (not efi-app-aarch64).
EFI_OBJCOPY_TARGET=pei-aarch64-little
# --allow-multiple-definition: gnu-efi's libefi init.o (pulled in for
# InitializeLib) also defines memset/memcpy; wolfBoot's src/string.o comes
# first in link order and wins.
LDFLAGS = -shared -Bsymbolic --allow-multiple-definition \
-L$(GNU_EFI_LIB_PATH) -T$(GNU_EFI_LSCRIPT)
LD_START_GROUP = $(GNU_EFI_CRT0)
LD_END_GROUP = -lgnuefi -lefi
LD = $(CROSS_COMPILE)ld
UPDATE_OBJS:=src/update_ram.o
endif
ifeq ($(ARCH),sim)
USE_GCC_HEADLESS=0
LD = gcc
@ -2193,6 +2235,19 @@ endif
## Update mechanism
ifeq ($(ARCH),AARCH64)
ifeq ($(TARGET),aarch64_efi)
# UEFI app: UEFI owns MMU/FDT, so skip the -DMMU/-DWOLFBOOT_FDT DTS path and
# fdt.o/gpt.o (like x86_64_efi). update_ram.o is set in the block above.
# DEBUG=1: route wolfBoot_printf to the UEFI console (gnu-efi Print).
ifeq ($(DEBUG),1)
CFLAGS += -DWOLFBOOT_DEBUG_EFI=1
endif
# Drop -Werror for this target: WOLFBOOT_DEBUG_EFI pulls gnu-efi headers into
# every TU and efidebug.h redefines the -DDEBUG object macro as a function
# macro. That cpp macro-redefinition warning has no -W name, so it can't be
# scoped with -Wno-error=<name>; our own sources are kept warning-clean.
CFLAGS := $(filter-out -Werror,$(CFLAGS))
else
CFLAGS+=-DMMU -DWOLFBOOT_FDT -DWOLFBOOT_DUALBOOT
OBJS+=src/fdt.o
# src/gpt.c provides the CRC32 helpers reused by update_ram.c's uImage
@ -2213,6 +2268,7 @@ ifeq ($(ARCH),AARCH64)
# RAM-based boot from external flash (default)
UPDATE_OBJS:=src/update_ram.o
endif
endif
else
ifeq ($(DUALBANK_SWAP),1)
CFLAGS+=-DWOLFBOOT_DUALBOOT

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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
# AArch64 UEFI application - wolfBoot as a UEFI app (the AArch64 sibling of the
# x86_64_efi target). Validated on the NVIDIA Jetson Orin Nano (Tegra234).
#
# wolfBoot builds as an AArch64 UEFI application (wolfboot.efi) launched by the
# platform UEFI firmware. It reads kernel.img/update.img from the EFI Simple
# File System, verifies them, and boots via UEFI LoadImage/StartImage.
# Modeled on config/examples/x86_64_efi.config.
#
# Prerequisite: build gnu-efi for AArch64 first (one-time):
# ./tools/scripts/build-gnu-efi-aarch64.sh
# then: cp config/examples/aarch64_efi.config .config && make
#
# Crypto starts on ED25519/SHA256 (matches the proven x86 EFI target) to
# de-risk the first build. Switch to ECC384/SHA384 once the port builds and
# runs: set SIGN?=ECC384, HASH?=SHA384, SPMATH=1 (pulls in SP math objects).
ARCH=AARCH64
TARGET=aarch64_efi
WOLFBOOT_SMALL_STACK=1
SIGN?=ED25519
HASH?=SHA256
DEBUG=1
SPMATH=0
# required for keytools
WOLFBOOT_SECTOR_SIZE?=0x1000
WOLFBOOT_NO_PARTITIONS=1

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@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ This README describes configuration of supported targets.
* [NXP T10xx PPC (T1024 / T1040)](#nxp-qoriq-t10xx-ppc-t1024--t1040)
* [NXP T2080 PPC](#nxp-qoriq-t2080-ppc)
* [Qemu x86-64 UEFI](#qemu-x86-64-uefi)
* [NVIDIA Jetson Orin (aarch64_efi)](#nvidia-jetson-orin-aarch64_efi)
* [Raspberry Pi pico 2 (rp2350)](#raspberry-pi-pico-rp2350)
* [RealTek RTL8735B (AmebaPro2)](#realtek-rtl8735b-amebapro2)
* [Renesas RA6M4](#renesas-ra6m4)
@ -7783,6 +7784,171 @@ You can `Ctrl-C` or login as `root` and power off qemu with `poweroff`
## NVIDIA Jetson Orin (aarch64_efi)
The `aarch64_efi` target builds wolfBoot as an AArch64 UEFI application (`wolfboot.efi`), the direct counterpart of the [Qemu x86-64 UEFI](#qemu-x86-64-uefi) target. It uses only UEFI Boot Services (no SoC-specific registers), so the same binary runs on any AArch64 UEFI platform. It has been validated on the NVIDIA Jetson Orin Nano Developer Kit (Tegra234), where the on-module UEFI firmware (edk2-nvidia) launches it after the NVIDIA-signed early boot chain (BootROM -> MB1 -> MB2 -> UEFI). wolfBoot reads the next-stage image from the EFI Simple File System, authenticates it with wolfCrypt, and boots it via the UEFI `LoadImage`/`StartImage` services (an AArch64 Linux `Image` is itself a PE/COFF EFI-stub application).
### Prerequisites
* An AArch64 GNU toolchain (`aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc`)
* gnu-efi built for AArch64 (the host distro package is usually x86-only, so build it with the helper script below)
* For emulation: `qemu-system-aarch64` plus the AArch64 UEFI firmware (AAVMF, package `qemu-efi-aarch64`)
On a debian-like system:
```
apt install git make gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu dosfstools mtools
apt install qemu-system-arm qemu-efi-aarch64 # emulation (optional)
```
Build the AArch64 gnu-efi runtime once (installs into `tools/gnu-efi-aarch64/`):
```
./tools/scripts/build-gnu-efi-aarch64.sh
```
### Configuration
An example configuration is provided in [config/examples/aarch64_efi.config](config/examples/aarch64_efi.config). It selects `ARCH=AARCH64`, `TARGET=aarch64_efi`, and a signature/hash algorithm (ED25519/SHA256 by default). No partition addresses are required -- UEFI provides the storage and dynamic image placement.
### Building
```
cp config/examples/aarch64_efi.config .config
make
```
This produces `wolfboot.efi`, a PE32+ AArch64 EFI application (objcopy output format `pei-aarch64-little`).
### Signing a payload
Sign the image to boot (an AArch64 Linux `Image`, or any EFI application for testing) with the generated key, tagging it with a version. wolfBoot looks for `kernel.img` and `update.img` on the volume it was launched from and boots the higher valid version:
```
./tools/keytools/sign --ed25519 --sha256 Image wolfboot_signing_private_key.der 1
cp Image_v1_signed.bin kernel.img
```
### Running in QEMU
```
./tools/scripts/aarch64-efi-qemu.sh # add --gdb to debug with gdb-multiarch
```
The script exposes a scratch directory to the UEFI firmware as a FAT ESP, copies `wolfboot.efi` (and `kernel.img` from `aarch64_efi-stage/` if present), and auto-runs it.
### Deploying on the Jetson Orin Nano
The Jetson UEFI auto-boots removable media via `\EFI\BOOT\BOOTAA64.EFI`. Place wolfBoot and a signed payload on a FAT32 partition:
```
\EFI\BOOT\BOOTAA64.EFI <- wolfboot.efi
\kernel.img <- signed payload (read from the volume root)
\cmdline.txt <- optional Linux kernel command line (see below)
```
Insert the card and power on; UEFI auto-launches wolfBoot, which verifies and boots the payload. The debug console on the Orin Nano Developer Kit is the J14 button header (not the 40-pin), 115200 8N1. Example output:
```
Image base: 0x25E5D4000
Opening file: kernel.img, size: 57969
Checking integrity...done
Verifying signature...done
Successfully selected image in part: 0
Firmware Valid
Booting at 0x5E254100
Staging kernel at address 5E254100, size: 57969
```
### Booting Linux
An AArch64 Linux `Image` carries a PE/COFF EFI stub, so wolfBoot boots it with the same `LoadImage`/`StartImage` path used above -- no initrd or bare-metal handoff is needed when the kernel has built-in MMC/ext4 drivers (the NVIDIA L4T kernel does). This has been validated end to end on the Jetson Orin Nano: wolfBoot verifies the signed kernel and boots NVIDIA Jetson Linux (L4T R36.4.4, `5.15.148-tegra`) all the way to an Ubuntu 22.04 login prompt.
Obtain a Tegra234-compatible kernel and root filesystem from the [NVIDIA Jetson Linux (L4T)](https://developer.nvidia.com/embedded/jetson-linux) BSP. The driver package (`Jetson_Linux_R36.x.x_aarch64.tbz2`) contains `Linux_for_Tegra/kernel/Image` and `Linux_for_Tegra/kernel/dtb/tegra234-*.dtb`; the matching `Tegra_Linux_Sample-Root-Filesystem_*.tbz2` provides the rootfs.
Sign the kernel `Image` with the wolfBoot key and name it `kernel.img`:
```
./tools/keytools/sign --ed25519 --sha256 Linux_for_Tegra/kernel/Image \
wolfboot_signing_private_key.der 1
cp Linux_for_Tegra/kernel/Image_v1_signed.bin kernel.img
```
Lay out the microSD as a FAT ESP plus a rootfs partition and place:
```
FAT (p1): \EFI\BOOT\BOOTAA64.EFI <- wolfboot.efi (UEFI auto-boots this)
\kernel.img <- signed L4T kernel
\cmdline.txt <- kernel command line (below)
ext4 (p2): the L4T sample root filesystem
```
`cmdline.txt` (read by wolfBoot and passed to the kernel via `LoadOptions`):
```
root=/dev/mmcblk0p2 rw rootwait console=ttyTCU0,115200
```
On power-up the Jetson UEFI auto-boots `\EFI\BOOT\BOOTAA64.EFI`; wolfBoot verifies `kernel.img` and hands off to the kernel, which receives the real Tegra234 device tree from the UEFI configuration table (`EFI stub: Using DTB from configuration table`), mounts `mmcblk0p2`, and brings up systemd and the login on the J14 debug console (`ttyTCU0`).
Security note: the plaintext `\cmdline.txt` is not covered by the image signature. For a production trust chain the command line should be authenticated -- baked into the signed image, or supplied via the device-tree `/chosen` bootargs. An initramfs-based flow (rather than a direct `root=` mount) would additionally need initrd support via the `LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID` LoadFile2 protocol, which this target does not currently implement.
### Root of trust: enrolling wolfBoot into UEFI Secure Boot
The steps above give wolfBoot verifying the kernel. To close the remaining gap -- the firmware verifying `wolfboot.efi` itself -- enroll wolfBoot into UEFI Secure Boot so the platform refuses to launch an unsigned or tampered `wolfboot.efi`. This makes the chain continuous: firmware -> `wolfboot.efi` -> kernel.
`tools/scripts/sign-efi-secureboot.sh` generates a Platform Key (PK), Key Exchange Key (KEK) and signature-database (db) key/cert, signs `wolfboot.efi` with the db key, and emits the signed variable updates (`.auth`) for enrollment:
```
./tools/scripts/sign-efi-secureboot.sh wolfboot.efi
```
This produces `wolfboot.efi.signed` and, under `tools/efi-secureboot-keys/`, the `PK`/`KEK`/`db` key and cert plus the signed variable updates (`db.auth`, `KEK.auth`, `PK.auth`). (It requires `sbsigntool`, `efitools`, and `openssl`; `sbsign` may print benign "gaps between PE/COFF sections" warnings for gnu-efi images -- signing and `sbverify` still pass.)
The Jetson edk2 UEFI Shell `setvar` cannot enroll authenticated variables (it has no file input and cannot set the time-based-authenticated attribute), so enroll from the UEFI **setup menu**, which reads the certificate files from the ESP. The menu's "Enroll ... Using File" expects DER-encoded certificates; convert the generated PEM certs once:
```
cd tools/efi-secureboot-keys
for k in PK KEK db; do openssl x509 -in $k.crt -outform DER -out $k.cer; done
```
Copy `db.cer`, `KEK.cer`, `PK.cer` and `wolfboot.efi.signed` onto the ESP (deploy the signed image as `\EFI\BOOT\BOOTAA64.EFI`). Name the cert files with a **lowercase** `.cer` extension: the edk2 file explorer decides a file is a certificate by a case-sensitive suffix match against `.cer`/`.der`/`.crt`, so an uppercase `DB.CER` (as FAT stores a plain 8.3 name) is rejected with "Unsupported file type!". Copy them with lowercase names (e.g. `mcopy db.cer ::/db.cer`) so the VFAT lowercase flag is set. Then, on the board (over the serial console -- use `minicom` or `screen`, not a plain pass-through, so the full-screen menu renders):
1. Reset and press `ESC` at the firmware banner (`ESC to enter Setup`) to enter Setup.
2. `Device Manager` -> `Secure Boot Configuration`.
3. Set `Secure Boot Mode` -> `Custom Mode` (reveals `Custom Secure Boot Options`).
4. Under `Custom Secure Boot Options`, enroll in order -- `db`, then `KEK`, then `PK` (enrolling PK is what turns Secure Boot enforcing and exits Setup Mode):
- `DB Options` -> `Enroll Signature` -> `Enroll Signature Using File` -> select `db.cer` -> accept the default signature-owner GUID -> `Commit Changes and Exit`.
- `KEK Options` -> `Enroll KEK` -> `Enroll KEK Using File` -> `KEK.cer` -> `Commit Changes and Exit`.
- `PK Options` -> `Enroll PK` -> `Enroll PK Using File` -> `PK.cer` -> `Commit Changes and Exit`.
5. Confirm `Current Secure Boot State: Enabled`, then reset.
On reboot the firmware verifies `\EFI\BOOT\BOOTAA64.EFI` against `db`, so the signed wolfBoot launches (`Verifying signature...done`). To prove enforcement, replace `BOOTAA64.EFI` with an unsigned `wolfboot.efi`; the firmware refuses it with a Security Violation. Secure Boot is fully reversible: in the same menu set `Secure Boot Mode` -> `Standard Mode`, or delete the PK, to return the board to Setup Mode.
Important -- sign the kernel for Secure Boot too. wolfBoot boots the kernel through the UEFI `LoadImage`/`StartImage` services, and with Secure Boot enforcing, `LoadImage` also verifies the kernel image against `db`. A kernel that is only wolfBoot-signed is rejected by `LoadImage` (wolfBoot prints `LoadImage failed: 0x<status>`), even though wolfBoot's own `Verifying signature...done` passed. Sign the raw `Image` with the db key (sbsign) first, then wolfBoot-sign the result, so the kernel is trusted by both UEFI (`db`, for `LoadImage`) and wolfBoot (wolfCrypt):
```
sbsign --key tools/efi-secureboot-keys/db.key --cert tools/efi-secureboot-keys/db.crt \
--output Image.sb Linux_for_Tegra/kernel/Image
./tools/keytools/sign --ed25519 --sha256 Image.sb wolfboot_signing_private_key.der 1
cp Image_v1_signed.bin kernel.img # note: sign drops the .sb, output is Image_v1_signed.bin
```
The full enforced chain is then firmware -> (Secure Boot) -> wolfBoot -> (wolfCrypt + Secure Boot) -> kernel -> Linux.
Test this without hardware first: the QEMU + AAVMF helper (`tools/scripts/aarch64-efi-qemu.sh`) uses OVMF/AAVMF variable storage that supports enrolling the same keys, so you can confirm the signed binary launches and a wrong-key binary is refused before touching the board.
Note on the Jetson dev kit: the OP-TEE console prints "Test UEFI variable auth key is being used" / "UEFI variable protection is not fully enabled", i.e. the variable store is in a development state (`SetupMode=1`), which is why menu enrollment works without a prior platform key. A production device would additionally fuse-lock the variable store (see below).
### Root of trust: NVIDIA fuse provisioning (production; not performed here)
UEFI Secure Boot above is enforced by the edk2 firmware. On a production Jetson the firmware chain (BootROM -> MB1 -> MB2 -> cpu-bootloader/UEFI) is itself made tamper-resistant by burning the NVIDIA security fuses from the L4T BSP:
- PKC (public-key crypto) fuses: burn the SHA of your signing public key so the BootROM only accepts an NVIDIA-signing-chain that you control.
- SBK (secure boot key) fuses: optionally encrypt the boot binaries.
These are burned with `odmfuse.sh`/`tegrasign` from `Linux_for_Tegra/` and are irreversible. They are the final production step and are intentionally NOT part of this port -- the development board stays in unfused/dev mode. Consult the NVIDIA Jetson Linux "Secure Boot" documentation for the current `odmfuse.sh` procedure for your module before burning anything. Once fused, the fused firmware enforces UEFI Secure Boot, which enforces `wolfboot.efi`, which enforces the kernel -- a complete hardware root of trust.
## Intel x86_64 with Intel FSP support
This setup is more complex than the UEFI approach described earlier, but allows

411
hal/aarch64_efi.c 100644
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@ -0,0 +1,411 @@
/* aarch64_efi.c
*
* Copyright (C) 2026 wolfSSL Inc.
*
* This file is part of wolfBoot.
*
* wolfBoot is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* wolfBoot is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1335, USA
*/
/* Generic AArch64 UEFI-application HAL (validated on NVIDIA Jetson Orin Nano,
* Tegra234 / Cortex-A78AE).
*
* wolfBoot runs here as an AArch64 UEFI application (wolfboot.efi), launched
* by the platform UEFI firmware. It reads the kernel image from the EFI
* Simple File System, verifies it with wolfCrypt, and hands off to it via
* the UEFI LoadImage/StartImage services (the AArch64 Linux Image is itself
* a PE/COFF EFI-stub application). UEFI owns DRAM/MMU/GIC state, so this HAL
* needs no bare-metal init; the flash ops are stubs and storage/console come
* from UEFI Boot Services. This is the AArch64 sibling of hal/x86_64_efi.c. */
#include <stdint.h>
#include <target.h>
#include "image.h"
#include "loader.h"
#include "printf.h"
#ifdef TARGET_aarch64_efi
/* -DDEBUG (object macro from DEBUG=1) collides with gnu-efi efidebug.h's
* DEBUG(a); drop it before the EFI headers (unused here). */
#undef DEBUG
#include <efi/efi.h>
#include <efi/efilib.h>
#ifdef __WOLFBOOT
void hal_init(void)
{
}
void hal_prepare_boot(void)
{
}
#endif
#define PAGE_SIZE 0x1000
#define EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL_HW_TYPE 0x01
#define EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL_MEM_SUBTYPE 0x03
static EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *gSystemTable;
static EFI_HANDLE gImageHandle;
EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS kernel_addr;
EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS update_addr;
/* Optional Linux kernel command line, read from \cmdline.txt on the ESP and
* handed to the kernel EFI stub via LoadOptions (see aarch64_efi_do_boot). */
static CHAR16 *kernel_cmdline = NULL;
static UINTN kernel_cmdline_bytes = 0;
int RAMFUNCTION hal_flash_write(uintptr_t address, const uint8_t *data, int len)
{
(void)address; (void)data; (void)len;
return 0;
}
void RAMFUNCTION hal_flash_unlock(void)
{
}
void RAMFUNCTION hal_flash_lock(void)
{
}
int RAMFUNCTION hal_flash_erase(uintptr_t address, int len)
{
(void)address; (void)len;
return 0;
}
void* hal_get_primary_address(void)
{
return (void*)kernel_addr;
}
void* hal_get_update_address(void)
{
return (void*)update_addr;
}
void *hal_get_dts_address(void)
{
return NULL;
}
void *hal_get_dts_update_address(void)
{
return NULL;
}
static void panic()
{
while(1) {}
}
void RAMFUNCTION aarch64_efi_do_boot(const uint32_t *boot_addr)
{
const uint32_t *size;
const uint8_t* manifest = ((const uint8_t*)boot_addr) - IMAGE_HEADER_SIZE;
MEMMAP_DEVICE_PATH mem_path_device[2];
EFI_HANDLE kernelImageHandle;
EFI_STATUS status;
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *kernel_li = NULL;
EFI_GUID lipGuid = EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
size = (const uint32_t *)(manifest + 4);
/* Guard against a zero-size image: EndingAddress below would underflow and
* an empty range would be handed to LoadImage (and the TCG2 measurement). */
if (*size == 0) {
wolfBoot_printf("invalid zero-size image\n");
panic();
}
mem_path_device->Header.Type = EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL_HW_TYPE;
mem_path_device->Header.SubType = EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL_MEM_SUBTYPE;
mem_path_device->MemoryType = EfiLoaderData;
mem_path_device->StartingAddress = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(uintptr_t)boot_addr;
/* MEMMAP_DEVICE_PATH EndingAddress is inclusive (last valid byte). */
mem_path_device->EndingAddress =
(EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)((uintptr_t)boot_addr + *size - 1);
SetDevicePathNodeLength(&mem_path_device->Header,
sizeof(MEMMAP_DEVICE_PATH));
SetDevicePathEndNode(&mem_path_device[1].Header);
wolfBoot_printf("Staging kernel at address %p, size: %u\n", (void*)boot_addr, *size);
status = uefi_call_wrapper(gSystemTable->BootServices->LoadImage,
6,
0, /* bool */
gImageHandle,
(EFI_DEVICE_PATH*)mem_path_device,
(void*)(uintptr_t)boot_addr,
*size,
&kernelImageHandle);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
wolfBoot_printf("LoadImage failed: 0x%lx\n", (unsigned long)status);
panic();
}
/* Pass the kernel command line (from \cmdline.txt) to the loaded image via
* LoadOptions for the Linux EFI stub. For a production trust chain the
* cmdline should be authenticated (in the signed image or DT /chosen), not
* a plaintext file. A direct root= boot needs no initrd; an initramfs flow
* would add it via LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID (LoadFile2). */
if (kernel_cmdline != NULL) {
status = uefi_call_wrapper(gSystemTable->BootServices->HandleProtocol, 3,
kernelImageHandle, &lipGuid,
(void**)&kernel_li);
if (status == EFI_SUCCESS && kernel_li != NULL) {
kernel_li->LoadOptions = kernel_cmdline;
kernel_li->LoadOptionsSize = (UINT32)kernel_cmdline_bytes;
}
}
status = uefi_call_wrapper(gSystemTable->BootServices->StartImage,
3,
kernelImageHandle, 0, NULL);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
wolfBoot_printf("StartImage failed: 0x%lx\n", (unsigned long)status);
panic();
}
}
static UINT64 FileSize(EFI_FILE_HANDLE FileHandle)
{
EFI_FILE_INFO *FileInfo;
UINT64 ret;
FileInfo = LibFileInfo(FileHandle);
if (FileInfo == NULL) {
panic();
return 0; /* Never reached, for static analyzer */
}
ret = FileInfo->FileSize;
FreePool(FileInfo);
return ret;
}
static EFI_FILE_HANDLE GetVolume(EFI_HANDLE image)
{
EFI_GUID fsGuid = EFI_SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_PROTOCOL_GUID;
EFI_GUID lipGuid = EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *loaded_image = NULL;
EFI_FILE_IO_INTERFACE *IOVolume;
EFI_FILE_HANDLE Volume;
EFI_STATUS status;
status = uefi_call_wrapper(BS->HandleProtocol, 3,
image, &lipGuid, (void **) &loaded_image);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
panic();
status = uefi_call_wrapper(BS->HandleProtocol, 3,
loaded_image->DeviceHandle,
&fsGuid, (VOID*)&IOVolume);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
panic();
status = uefi_call_wrapper(IOVolume->OpenVolume, 2, IOVolume, &Volume);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
panic();
return Volume;
}
static EFI_FILE_HANDLE openFile(CHAR16 *file, EFI_FILE_HANDLE volume)
{
EFI_FILE_HANDLE file_handle;
EFI_STATUS status;
/* Open() ignores Attributes for read-only access (they only apply with
* EFI_FILE_MODE_CREATE); pass 0 so stricter firmware does not reject it. */
status = uefi_call_wrapper(volume->Open, 5,
volume,
&file_handle,
file,
EFI_FILE_MODE_READ,
0);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
file_handle = NULL;
return file_handle;
}
static int open_kernel_image(EFI_FILE_HANDLE vol, CHAR16 *filename,
EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS *_addr, uint32_t *sz)
{
EFI_FILE_HANDLE file;
EFI_STATUS status;
UINTN readsz;
UINTN pages;
/* Always leave *_addr well-defined so the caller's "no image" check is
* reliable: 0 on any failure, the loaded address only on full success. */
*_addr = 0;
*sz = 0;
file = openFile(filename, vol);
if (file == NULL)
return -1;
*sz = FileSize(file);
pages = (*sz / PAGE_SIZE) + 1;
wolfBoot_printf("Opening file: %s, size: %u\n", filename, *sz);
status = uefi_call_wrapper(BS->AllocatePages,
4,
AllocateAnyPages,
EfiLoaderData,
pages, _addr);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
wolfBoot_printf("AllocatePages failed: 0x%lx\n", (unsigned long)status);
*_addr = 0;
uefi_call_wrapper(file->Close, 1, file);
return status;
}
/* EFI_FILE Read() takes UINTN *BufferSize and VOID *Buffer. On AArch64
* uefi_call_wrapper is a native passthrough (no arg casting), so pass the
* correct types explicitly rather than a uint32_t pointer and an integer
* address. */
readsz = (UINTN)*sz;
status = uefi_call_wrapper(file->Read, 3, file, &readsz,
(void*)(uintptr_t)*_addr);
*sz = (uint32_t)readsz;
uefi_call_wrapper(file->Close, 1, file); /* done with the file */
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
wolfBoot_printf("file Read failed: 0x%lx\n", (unsigned long)status);
uefi_call_wrapper(BS->FreePages, 2, *_addr, pages);
*_addr = 0;
return status;
}
if (*sz < IMAGE_HEADER_SIZE) {
wolfBoot_printf("Image smaller than the header\n");
uefi_call_wrapper(BS->FreePages, 2, *_addr, pages);
*_addr = 0;
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Read an optional \cmdline.txt (ASCII) from the ESP into a widechar buffer
* for the kernel LoadOptions. No-op (leaves kernel_cmdline NULL) if absent. */
static void read_cmdline(EFI_FILE_HANDLE vol)
{
EFI_FILE_HANDLE file;
EFI_STATUS status;
UINT64 sz;
UINTN readsz, i, n;
uint8_t *ascii = NULL;
CHAR16 *wide = NULL;
file = openFile(L"cmdline.txt", vol);
if (file == NULL)
return; /* optional */
sz = FileSize(file);
if (sz == 0 || sz > 4096) {
uefi_call_wrapper(file->Close, 1, file);
return;
}
status = uefi_call_wrapper(BS->AllocatePool, 3, EfiLoaderData,
(UINTN)sz, (void**)&ascii);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS || ascii == NULL) {
uefi_call_wrapper(file->Close, 1, file);
return;
}
readsz = (UINTN)sz;
status = uefi_call_wrapper(file->Read, 3, file, &readsz, ascii);
uefi_call_wrapper(file->Close, 1, file); /* done with the file */
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
FreePool(ascii);
return;
}
/* trim trailing CR/LF/whitespace */
n = (UINTN)readsz;
while (n > 0 && (ascii[n-1] == '\n' || ascii[n-1] == '\r' ||
ascii[n-1] == ' ' || ascii[n-1] == '\t'))
n--;
status = uefi_call_wrapper(BS->AllocatePool, 3, EfiLoaderData,
(n + 1) * sizeof(CHAR16), (void**)&wide);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS || wide == NULL) {
FreePool(ascii);
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
wide[i] = (CHAR16)ascii[i];
wide[n] = 0;
FreePool(ascii);
kernel_cmdline = wide;
kernel_cmdline_bytes = (n + 1) * sizeof(CHAR16);
wolfBoot_printf("Kernel cmdline (%d chars) from cmdline.txt\n", (int)n);
}
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
efi_main (EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable)
{
CHAR16 *kernel_filename = L"kernel.img";
CHAR16 *update_filename = L"update.img";
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *loaded_image = NULL;
EFI_FILE_HANDLE vol;
EFI_STATUS status;
uint32_t kernel_size, update_size;
InitializeLib(ImageHandle, SystemTable);
gSystemTable = SystemTable;
gImageHandle = ImageHandle;
status = uefi_call_wrapper(SystemTable->BootServices->HandleProtocol,
3,
ImageHandle,
&LoadedImageProtocol,
(void **)&loaded_image);
if (status == EFI_SUCCESS)
wolfBoot_printf("Image base: 0x%lx\n", loaded_image->ImageBase);
vol = GetVolume(ImageHandle);
read_cmdline(vol);
/* open_kernel_image() leaves *_addr == 0 on failure (and frees any pages),
* so the "no image" check below is reliable; the sizes are logged inside
* and not needed here. */
(void)open_kernel_image(vol, kernel_filename, &kernel_addr, &kernel_size);
(void)open_kernel_image(vol, update_filename, &update_addr, &update_size);
(void)kernel_size;
(void)update_size;
if (kernel_addr == 0 && update_addr == 0) {
wolfBoot_printf("No image to load\n");
panic();
}
wolfBoot_start();
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
#endif /* TARGET_aarch64_efi */

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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
# aarch64_efi is a UEFI application target; the link uses the linker script
# provided by gnu-efi (elf_aarch64_efi.lds via GNU_EFI_LSCRIPT). This is an
# empty file to appease the Makefile (mirrors hal/x86_64_efi.ld).

View File

@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
/* boot_aarch64_efi.c
*
* Copyright (C) 2026 wolfSSL Inc.
*
* This file is part of wolfBoot.
*
* wolfBoot is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* wolfBoot is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1335, USA
*/
/* AArch64 UEFI-application boot glue (generic AArch64 UEFI target).
*
* When wolfBoot is built as a UEFI application the gnu-efi CRT0 is the entry
* point and efi_main() (hal/aarch64_efi.c) does all the work, so none of the
* bare-metal reset / EL2->EL1 / cache-teardown path in boot_aarch64.c applies.
* This provides the do_boot() the updater (src/update_ram.c) calls; it simply
* forwards the verified image to the UEFI LoadImage/StartImage handoff in
* hal/aarch64_efi.c. Mirrors src/boot_x86_64.c. */
#include <stdint.h>
#include "image.h"
#include "loader.h"
#include "wolfboot/wolfboot.h"
#ifdef TARGET_aarch64_efi
/* aarch64_efi never defines MMU (UEFI owns MMU/FDT), so do_boot has only the
* app-only form; it forwards the verified image to the LoadImage/StartImage
* handoff in hal/aarch64_efi.c. */
extern void RAMFUNCTION aarch64_efi_do_boot(const uint32_t *boot_addr);
void RAMFUNCTION do_boot(const uint32_t *app_offset)
{
aarch64_efi_do_boot(app_offset);
}
#endif /* TARGET_aarch64_efi */

View File

@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ const char Store_hdr[] = "\n"
"#define KEYSTORE_SECTION __attribute__((section (\"__KEYSTORE,__keystore\")))\n"
"#elif defined(__CCRX__) || defined(WOLFBOOT_RENESAS_RSIP) || defined(WOLFBOOT_RENESAS_TSIP) || defined(WOLFBOOT_RENESAS_SCEPROTECT)\n"
"#define KEYSTORE_SECTION /* Renesas RX */\n"
"#elif defined(TARGET_x86_64_efi)\n"
"#elif defined(TARGET_x86_64_efi) || defined(TARGET_aarch64_efi)\n"
"#define KEYSTORE_SECTION\n"
"#else\n"
"#define KEYSTORE_SECTION __attribute__((section (\".keystore\")))\n"

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@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Run the aarch64_efi wolfboot.efi in QEMU aarch64 UEFI for fast iteration/debug.
# No hardware / USB stick needed: a scratch dir is exposed to UEFI as a FAT ESP.
#
# ./tools/scripts/aarch64-efi-qemu.sh # run, auto-launch wolfboot.efi
# ./tools/scripts/aarch64-efi-qemu.sh --gdb # freeze at reset for gdb (-s -S)
# ./tools/scripts/aarch64-efi-qemu.sh --fresh-vars # reset the UEFI NVRAM store
#
# In another shell for --gdb:
# gdb-multiarch wolfboot.elf -ex 'target remote :1234'
set -e
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." && pwd)"
ESP="$ROOT/tools/qemu-esp"
CODE=/usr/share/AAVMF/AAVMF_CODE.fd
VARS_SRC=/usr/share/AAVMF/AAVMF_VARS.fd
for f in "$CODE" "$VARS_SRC"; do
[ -r "$f" ] || { echo "Missing $f -- install qemu-efi-aarch64"; exit 1; }
done
command -v qemu-system-aarch64 >/dev/null || { echo "Install qemu-system-arm"; exit 1; }
mkdir -p "$ESP"
cp "$ROOT/wolfboot.efi" "$ESP"/
cp "$ROOT/aarch64_efi-stage/kernel.img" "$ESP"/ 2>/dev/null || true
# optional Linux kernel command line (M3): read by wolfboot as \cmdline.txt
cp "$ROOT/aarch64_efi-stage/cmdline.txt" "$ESP"/ 2>/dev/null || true
# auto-run wolfboot.efi from the UEFI shell
printf 'fs0:\r\nwolfboot.efi\r\n' > "$ESP/startup.nsh"
# Parse flags (order-independent).
GDB_ARGS=""
FRESH_VARS=0
for arg in "$@"; do
case "$arg" in
--gdb) GDB_ARGS="-s -S" ;;
--fresh-vars) FRESH_VARS=1 ;;
esac
done
# Preserve the UEFI variable store (including any Secure Boot key enrollment)
# across runs; recreate it only when missing or when --fresh-vars is given.
VARS="$ROOT/tools/qemu-esp/AAVMF_VARS.fd"
if [ ! -f "$VARS" ] || [ "$FRESH_VARS" = "1" ]; then
cp "$VARS_SRC" "$VARS"
fi
if [ -n "$GDB_ARGS" ]; then
echo "GDB mode: qemu frozen. In another shell:"
echo " gdb-multiarch $ROOT/wolfboot.elf -ex 'target remote :1234'"
fi
exec qemu-system-aarch64 \
-machine virt -cpu cortex-a72 -m 1024 -smp 1 \
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,file="$CODE",readonly=on \
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,file="$VARS" \
-drive format=raw,file=fat:rw:"$ESP" \
-net none -nographic $GDB_ARGS

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@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Build gnu-efi for AArch64 (for the wolfBoot aarch64_efi UEFI target).
# Installs crt0-efi-aarch64.o, elf_aarch64_efi.lds, libgnuefi.a, libefi.a
# and the EFI headers into tools/gnu-efi-aarch64/ inside the wolfBoot tree.
#
# GNU_EFI_REF is pinned to a released tag so the runtime CRT0/linker-script/libs
# are reproducible and auditable (the aarch64_efi link depends on the exact
# revision -- see the --allow-multiple-definition note in arch.mk). Override:
# CROSS_COMPILE=... GNU_EFI_REF=... ./build-gnu-efi-aarch64.sh
set -e
CROSS_COMPILE="${CROSS_COMPILE:-aarch64-linux-gnu-}"
GNU_EFI_REF="${GNU_EFI_REF:-4.0.4}"
# Resolve wolfBoot root (this script lives in tools/scripts/)
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
PREFIX="$ROOT/tools/gnu-efi-aarch64"
SRC="$ROOT/tools/gnu-efi-src"
echo "== gnu-efi aarch64 build =="
echo " CROSS_COMPILE=$CROSS_COMPILE"
echo " PREFIX=$PREFIX"
# gnu-efi upstream (Nigel Croxon, the gnu-efi maintainer). Pin to $GNU_EFI_REF;
# if the tree already exists, force it onto that ref (reproducible re-runs).
if [ ! -d "$SRC/.git" ]; then
git clone --depth 1 -b "$GNU_EFI_REF" https://github.com/ncroxon/gnu-efi "$SRC"
else
git -C "$SRC" fetch --depth 1 origin tag "$GNU_EFI_REF" 2>/dev/null \
|| git -C "$SRC" fetch --depth 1 origin "$GNU_EFI_REF"
git -C "$SRC" checkout -q "$GNU_EFI_REF" 2>/dev/null \
|| git -C "$SRC" checkout -q FETCH_HEAD
make -C "$SRC" ARCH=aarch64 clean >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
make -C "$SRC" ARCH=aarch64 CROSS_COMPILE="$CROSS_COMPILE" -j"$(nproc)"
make -C "$SRC" ARCH=aarch64 CROSS_COMPILE="$CROSS_COMPILE" \
PREFIX=/ INSTALLROOT="$PREFIX" install
echo "== installed files =="
find "$PREFIX" -name 'crt0-efi-aarch64.o' -o -name 'elf_aarch64_efi.lds' \
-o -name 'libgnuefi.a' -o -name 'libefi.a' | sort
echo "== done =="

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@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Sign wolfboot.efi for UEFI Secure Boot and generate the PK/KEK/db enrollment
# material, so the platform firmware itself verifies wolfBoot before launching
# it (closing the code-signing gap: firmware -> wolfboot.efi -> kernel).
#
# This is the UEFI Secure Boot layer of the wolfBoot root of trust. It is
# independent of wolfBoot's own wolfCrypt verification of the payload, and of
# any NVIDIA fuse provisioning (documented separately in docs/Targets.md).
#
# Requires: sbsigntool (sbsign, sbverify) and efitools (cert-to-efi-sig-list,
# sign-efi-sig-list) and openssl. On Debian/Ubuntu:
# sudo apt install sbsigntool efitools openssl uuid-runtime
#
# Usage:
# ./tools/scripts/sign-efi-secureboot.sh [wolfboot.efi]
# Overrides (env):
# KEYDIR directory for the generated keys/certs (default tools/efi-secureboot-keys)
# EFI_BIN the PE image to sign (default: first arg, else wolfboot.efi)
# CN common-name prefix for the generated certs (default "wolfBoot")
#
# SECURITY: the generated PK/KEK/db private keys are UNENCRYPTED (openssl
# -nodes) and long-lived -- intended for lab/dev enrollment. They are created
# owner-only (umask 077 below); keep them off shared machines. For production,
# protect the signing keys (HSM or an encrypted key store) and treat this
# script only as the enrollment mechanism.
set -e
# Restrict permissions on everything this script creates: it writes private
# keys (PK/KEK/db .key), which must not be group/world-readable.
umask 077
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
KEYDIR="${KEYDIR:-$ROOT/tools/efi-secureboot-keys}"
EFI_BIN="${EFI_BIN:-${1:-$ROOT/wolfboot.efi}}"
CN="${CN:-wolfBoot}"
for tool in openssl sbsign sbverify cert-to-efi-sig-list sign-efi-sig-list; do
command -v "$tool" >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
echo "ERROR: required tool '$tool' not found." >&2
echo " install: sudo apt install sbsigntool efitools openssl uuid-runtime" >&2
exit 1
}
done
if [ ! -f "$EFI_BIN" ]; then
echo "ERROR: EFI image '$EFI_BIN' not found (build wolfboot.efi first)." >&2
exit 1
fi
# Resolve to an absolute path: we cd into KEYDIR below, after which a relative
# image path would no longer resolve.
EFI_BIN="$(cd "$(dirname "$EFI_BIN")" && pwd)/$(basename "$EFI_BIN")"
mkdir -p "$KEYDIR"
# Resolve to an absolute path: we cd into KEYDIR below but still reference
# "$KEYDIR/db.key" etc. afterward, which would break for a relative KEYDIR.
KEYDIR="$(cd "$KEYDIR" && pwd)"
cd "$KEYDIR"
# A stable GUID identifies the owner of the enrolled variables; persist it so
# repeated runs reuse the same identity.
if [ ! -f guid.txt ]; then
if command -v uuidgen >/dev/null 2>&1; then
uuidgen > guid.txt
else
# Fallback: derive a GUID from openssl if uuid-runtime is absent.
openssl rand -hex 16 | sed 's/\(........\)\(....\)\(....\)\(....\)\(............\)/\1-\2-\3-\4-\5/' > guid.txt
fi
fi
GUID="$(cat guid.txt)"
echo "== UEFI Secure Boot key owner GUID: $GUID =="
# Generate the Platform Key (PK), Key Exchange Key (KEK) and signature
# database (db) key/cert if they do not already exist. Self-signed X.509,
# 2048-bit RSA, long validity for lab/dev use.
gen_key() {
name="$1"; subject="$2"
if [ ! -f "$name.key" ] || [ ! -f "$name.crt" ]; then
echo "== generating $name key/cert ($subject) =="
echo " WARNING: $name.key is an UNENCRYPTED private key (dev/lab use)" >&2
openssl req -new -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -sha256 -days 3650 \
-subj "/CN=$subject/" -keyout "$name.key" -out "$name.crt"
fi
# ESL (EFI signature list) form of the cert, tagged with our owner GUID.
cert-to-efi-sig-list -g "$GUID" "$name.crt" "$name.esl"
}
gen_key PK "$CN PK"
gen_key KEK "$CN KEK"
gen_key db "$CN db"
# Build the signed variable updates (.auth) for enrollment:
# PK is signed by PK (self)
# KEK is signed by PK
# db is signed by KEK
echo "== building signed enrollment variables (.auth) =="
sign-efi-sig-list -g "$GUID" -k PK.key -c PK.crt PK PK.esl PK.auth
sign-efi-sig-list -g "$GUID" -k PK.key -c PK.crt KEK KEK.esl KEK.auth
sign-efi-sig-list -g "$GUID" -k KEK.key -c KEK.crt db db.esl db.auth
# Sign the wolfBoot PE image with the db key so the firmware accepts it.
SIGNED="${EFI_BIN}.signed"
echo "== signing $EFI_BIN with db key -> $SIGNED =="
sbsign --key "$KEYDIR/db.key" --cert "$KEYDIR/db.crt" \
--output "$SIGNED" "$EFI_BIN"
sbverify --cert "$KEYDIR/db.crt" "$SIGNED"
echo "== done =="
echo "Signed image: $SIGNED"
echo "Enroll on the target (UEFI setup / KeyTool / QEMU AAVMF vars) in order:"
echo " db <- $KEYDIR/db.auth"
echo " KEK <- $KEYDIR/KEK.auth"
echo " PK <- $KEYDIR/PK.auth (enabling PK turns Secure Boot enforcing)"
echo "Then deploy $SIGNED as \\EFI\\BOOT\\BOOTAA64.EFI (or your boot path)."