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F-14283: keep TFM hardening in DICE_HW secure-mode builds 

The WOLFBOOT_DICE_HW exception assumed hardware DICE leaves the
secure world verify-only, but only the DICE attestation key runs on
the crypto engine: the secure PSA service still does software RSA/ECC
on keys created or imported through the IPC, so drop the exception and
let every WOLFCRYPT_SECURE_MODE fastmath build define
TFM_TIMING_RESISTANT.
pull/913/head
Daniele Lacamera 2026-09-29 08:50:44 +02:00
parent d4cf395dc2
commit 410d8de24e
1 changed files with 5 additions and 3 deletions
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8
include/user_settings.h
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@ -169,9 +169,11 @@ extern int tolower(int c);
/* WC_NO_HARDEN suits verify-only builds, which do public-key
* operations only. Secure-mode worlds (TZ_PSA/PKCS11/FWTPM/WOLFHSM)
* process private keys in software, so they keep the timing-
* resistant TFM path; hardware DICE keeps signing in the crypto
* engine and stays verify-only. */
# if defined(WOLFCRYPT_SECURE_MODE) && !defined(WOLFBOOT_DICE_HW)
* resistant TFM path. Hardware DICE (WOLFBOOT_DICE_HW) only moves the
* DICE attestation key to the crypto engine; the secure PSA service
* still runs software RSA/ECC on keys created or imported through the
* IPC, so it needs the hardening too. */
# if defined(WOLFCRYPT_SECURE_MODE)
# define TFM_TIMING_RESISTANT
# else
/* tfm.c never tests WC_NO_HARDEN, so dropping it alone changes