F-9759: document that QE/FMan microcode is not authenticated

The P1021 QE and T10xx QE/FMan microcode blobs are validated only for
structural integrity (header magic, version, size bounds) before they
are activated; no cryptographic authentication is applied. State that
in Targets.md for both targets, with the deployment-model reasoning:
the P1021 microcode region sits inside the update partition, and the
T10xx regions require local board flash write access, which also
allows replacing the wolfBoot image itself.

Same residual claim as F-8000 and F-9761 (T10xx QE and FMan paths);
the bounds fixes for all three are already in master (000c05c7,
91c020a2). Product decision: no microcode authentication feature.
pull/868/head
Daniele Lacamera 2026-08-20 22:41:58 +02:00 committed by Daniele Lacamera
parent 0a6a5fe360
commit 431b01560d
1 changed files with 15 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -5736,6 +5736,14 @@ A first stage loader is required to load the wolfBoot image into DDR for executi
| fsl_qe_ucode_1021_10_A.bin | 0x01F00000 |
| swap block | 0x02200000 |
The QE microcode programmed at `0x01F00000` is validated only for
structural integrity (header magic, version, and size bounds) before it
is activated; it is not cryptographically authenticated. This is out of
scope for the example configuration: the microcode region sits inside
the update partition, so replacing it requires the same flash write
access that would let an attacker replace the update image itself,
which wolfBoot's image authentication already protects against.
### Building wolfBoot for NXP P1021 PPC
By default wolfBoot will use `powerpc-linux-gnu-` cross-compiler prefix. These tools can be installed with the Debian package `gcc-powerpc-linux-gnu` (`sudo apt install gcc-powerpc-linux-gnu`).
@ -5888,6 +5896,13 @@ Note: On T1040, FMAN and QE firmware share the same 128KB NOR erase sector
(0xEFF00000-0xEFF1FFFF). They must be programmed together in a single
erase/write operation.
The QE and FMan microcode in these NOR regions is validated only for
structural integrity (header magic, version, and size bounds) before it
is activated; it is not cryptographically authenticated. This is out of
scope for the example configurations: programming these regions requires
local write access to the board's flash, which also allows replacing the
wolfBoot image itself - a threat the signed image flow already covers.
### Design
Both T1024 and T1040 use a two-stage boot. Stage1 runs XIP from NOR flash,