diff --git a/docs/TPM.md b/docs/TPM.md
index 94fd77f2..228b03f2 100644
--- a/docs/TPM.md
+++ b/docs/TPM.md
@@ -17,6 +17,42 @@ In wolfBoot we support TPM based root of trust, sealing/unsealing, cryptographic
 | `WOLFBOOT_TPM_SEAL=1` | `WOLFBOOT_TPM_SEAL` | Enables support for sealing/unsealing based on PCR policy signed externally. |
 | `WOLFBOOT_TPM_SEAL_NV_BASE=0x01400300` | `WOLFBOOT_TPM_SEAL_NV_BASE` | To override the default sealed blob storage location in the platform hierarchy. |
 | `WOLFBOOT_TPM_SEAL_AUTH=secret` | `WOLFBOOT_TPM_SEAL_AUTH` | Password for sealing/unsealing secrets, if omitted the PCR policy will be used |
+| `WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE=1` | `WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE` | MFG identity: opt into on-device derive-from-master. The default is a precomputed per-device authValue (no master secret on device). Requires `WOLFTPM_MFG_IDENTITY`. |
+| (header macro) | `WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AIK_AUTH` / `WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_EH_AUTH` | Default (precomputed) mode: the 16-byte per-device AIK / EH authValues (placeholder `0xFF` default). |
+| (header macro) | `WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_EH_MASTER` | Derive mode: override the endorsement-hierarchy master value (16-byte initializer list, sample default). |
+
+## TPM manufacturing identity (IAK / IDevID authValue)
+
+When `WOLFTPM_MFG_IDENTITY` is enabled, `wolfBoot_tpm2_get_aik()` and
+`wolfBoot_tpm2_get_timestamp()` authorize the pre-provisioned ST33KTPM identity
+keys. There are two ways to supply the required `authValue`:
+
+- **Precomputed mode (default, recommended).** The final **per-device**
+  `authValue` is set directly into the key handle; no master secret is present on
+  the device. Defaults to a `0xFF` placeholder (fails TPM auth until
+  provisioned). Per-device values are computed off-device at provisioning
+  (`SHA-256(CPSN || master)`, low 16 bytes) and baked in via
+  `WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AIK_AUTH` / `WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_EH_AUTH`. When `WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE` 
+  is not enabled, the `masterPassword` argument to `wolfBoot_tpm2_get_aik()` is
+  treated as an optional override for the final AIK `authValue` (not a master secret).
+
+- **Derive mode (`WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE`).** The `authValue` is computed
+  on-device as the low 16 bytes of `SHA-256(TPM serial || master)`. 
+  The endorsement master defaults to a sample and is overridable with
+  `WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_EH_MASTER`; the AIK master is passed to
+  `wolfBoot_tpm2_get_aik()` (NULL = sample). Convenient, but the master is
+  **shared across the whole reel/batch** — extracting it
+  from one device's firmware lets an attacker derive the `authValue` for every
+  sibling device.
+
+The byte-array macros are header defaults (overridable via `-D` / `CFLAGS_EXTRA`);
+they are not plain `options.mk` variables because brace initializers contain
+commas. `WOLFTPM_MFG_IDENTITY` itself is supplied via `CFLAGS_EXTRA`.
+
+> Note: because precomputed mode is the default and ships a `0xFF` placeholder, a
+> build that enables `WOLFTPM_MFG_IDENTITY` without provisioning the authValue (or
+> selecting `WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE`) fails TPM auth by design. The test-app
+> builds with `WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE` so it works on a sample TPM.
 
 ## Root of Trust (ROT)
 
diff --git a/include/tpm.h b/include/tpm.h
index 08cd1044..c1198288 100644
--- a/include/tpm.h
+++ b/include/tpm.h
@@ -60,6 +60,37 @@ int CSME_NSE_API wolfBoot_tpm2_read_pcr(uint8_t pcrIndex, uint8_t* digest, int*
 int CSME_NSE_API wolfBoot_tpm2_read_cert(uint32_t handle, uint8_t* cert, uint32_t* certSz);
 
 #ifdef WOLFTPM_MFG_IDENTITY
+
+/* MFG identity auth provisioning.
+ * Precomputed mode (default): the final per-device authValue is set directly,
+ * no master secret on the device. In this mode, wolfBoot_tpm2_get_aik() treats
+ * the masterPassword argument as an optional *authValue* override.
+ * Derive mode (WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE): authValue = low 16 bytes of
+ * SHA-256(TPM serial || master); the master is shared across the reel. 
+ * For wolfBott_tpm2_get_aik() the master password is provided via the
+ * masterPassword argument (NULL = sample). */
+#ifdef WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE
+/* EH master for derive mode (sample - override in production) */
+#ifndef WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_EH_MASTER
+#define WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_EH_MASTER { \
+    0xDE, 0xEF, 0x8C, 0xDF, 0x1B, 0x77, 0xBD, 0x00, \
+    0x30, 0x58, 0x5E, 0x47, 0xB8, 0x21, 0x46, 0x0B }
+#endif
+#else
+/* 16-byte per-device authValues. Placeholder defaults (all 0xFF) fail TPM auth
+ * until overwritten per-device by the provisioning tool. */
+#ifndef WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AIK_AUTH
+#define WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AIK_AUTH { \
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }
+#endif
+#ifndef WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_EH_AUTH
+#define WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_EH_AUTH { \
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }
+#endif
+#endif
+
 int CSME_NSE_API wolfBoot_tpm2_get_aik(WOLFTPM2_KEY* aik,
     uint8_t* masterPassword, uint16_t masterPasswordSz);
 int CSME_NSE_API wolfBoot_tpm2_get_timestamp(WOLFTPM2_KEY* aik, GetTime_Out* getTime);
diff --git a/options.mk b/options.mk
index 37f676d7..b6b18a5a 100644
--- a/options.mk
+++ b/options.mk
@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@ ifeq ($(WOLFBOOT_TPM_KEYSTORE),1)
   endif
 endif
 
+## TPM manufacturing identity: precomputed per-device authValue is the default
+## (no master secret on device). Opt into on-device derive-from-master mode:
+ifeq ($(WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE),1)
+  CFLAGS+=-D"WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE"
+endif
+
 ifeq ($(WOLFBOOT_ATTESTATION_IAK),1)
   CFLAGS+=-D"WOLFBOOT_ATTESTATION_IAK"
 endif
diff --git a/src/tpm.c b/src/tpm.c
index 6a11aad2..c4fcea4b 100644
--- a/src/tpm.c
+++ b/src/tpm.c
@@ -1363,11 +1363,26 @@ int CSME_NSE_API wolfBoot_tpm2_get_aik(WOLFTPM2_KEY* aik,
     /* Load existing AIK and set auth */
     rc = wolfTPM2_ReadPublicKey(&wolftpm_dev, aik, TPM2_IAK_KEY_HANDLE);
     if (rc == 0) {
-        /* Custom should supply their own custom master password used during
-         * device provisioning. If using a sample TPM supply NULL to use the
-         * default password. */
+#ifdef WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE
+        /* Derives the authValue on-device from a master secret shared across the
+         * reel; the precomputed default is preferred. Supply NULL for
+         * masterPassword to use the sample default. */
         rc = wolfTPM2_SetIdentityAuth(&wolftpm_dev, &aik->handle,
             masterPassword, masterPasswordSz);
+#else
+        /* Precomputed (default): set the final per-device authValue directly (no
+         * master secret on device). Caller may override the default via
+         * masterPassword. */
+        static const uint8_t aikAuth[] = WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AIK_AUTH;
+        const uint8_t* auth = (masterPassword != NULL) ? masterPassword : aikAuth;
+        uint16_t authSz = (masterPassword != NULL) ?
+            masterPasswordSz : (uint16_t)sizeof(aikAuth);
+        if (authSz > (uint16_t)sizeof(aik->handle.auth.buffer)) {
+            return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
+        }
+        aik->handle.auth.size = authSz;
+        XMEMCPY(aik->handle.auth.buffer, auth, authSz);
+#endif
     }
     return rc;
 }
@@ -1376,11 +1391,13 @@ int CSME_NSE_API wolfBoot_tpm2_get_timestamp(WOLFTPM2_KEY* aik, GetTime_Out* get
 {
     int rc;
     WOLFTPM2_HANDLE eh_handle;
-    /* sample master password for EH */
-    uint8_t Master_EH_AuthValue[] = {
-        0xDE, 0xEF, 0x8C, 0xDF, 0x1B, 0x77, 0xBD, 0x00,
-        0x30, 0x58, 0x5E, 0x47, 0xB8, 0x21, 0x46, 0x0B
-    };
+#ifdef WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE
+    /* EH master secret (shared across the reel) */
+    uint8_t Master_EH_AuthValue[] = WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_EH_MASTER;
+#else
+    /* final per-device EH authValue */
+    static const uint8_t eh_auth[] = WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_EH_AUTH;
+#endif
 
     if (aik == NULL || getTime == NULL) {
         return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
@@ -1395,9 +1412,19 @@ int CSME_NSE_API wolfBoot_tpm2_get_timestamp(WOLFTPM2_KEY* aik, GetTime_Out* get
 
     eh_handle.hndl = TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT;
 
+#ifdef WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE
     /* Calculate EH auth value */
     rc = wolfTPM2_SetIdentityAuth(&wolftpm_dev, &eh_handle,
         Master_EH_AuthValue, (uint16_t)sizeof(Master_EH_AuthValue));
+#else
+    /* Set EH authValue directly */
+    if (sizeof(eh_auth) > sizeof(eh_handle.auth.buffer)) {
+        return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
+    }
+    eh_handle.auth.size = (uint16_t)sizeof(eh_auth);
+    XMEMCPY(eh_handle.auth.buffer, eh_auth, sizeof(eh_auth));
+    rc = 0;
+#endif
     if (rc == 0) {
         /* Set EH auth */
         wolfTPM2_SetAuthHandle(&wolftpm_dev, 0, &eh_handle);
diff --git a/tools/config.mk b/tools/config.mk
index 98aa0dca..59d830f6 100644
--- a/tools/config.mk
+++ b/tools/config.mk
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ ifeq ($(ARCH),)
   MEASURED_BOOT?=0
   WOLFBOOT_TPM_SEAL?=0
   WOLFBOOT_TPM_KEYSTORE?=0
+  WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE?=0
   WOLFBOOT_ATTESTATION_IAK?=0
   WOLFBOOT_ATTESTATION_TEST?=0
   WOLFBOOT_UNIVERSAL_KEYSTORE?=0
@@ -106,6 +107,7 @@ CONFIG_VARS:= ARCH TARGET SIGN HASH MCUXSDK MCUXPRESSO MCUXPRESSO_CPU MCUXPRESSO
 	DISABLE_BACKUP WOLFBOOT_VERSION V NO_MPU ENCRYPT FLAGS_HOME FLAGS_INVERT \
 	SPMATH SPMATHALL RAM_CODE DUALBANK_SWAP IMAGE_HEADER_SIZE PKA TZEN PSOC6_CRYPTO \
 	WOLFTPM WOLFBOOT_TPM_VERIFY MEASURED_BOOT WOLFBOOT_TPM_SEAL WOLFBOOT_TPM_KEYSTORE \
+	WOLFBOOT_TPM_MFG_AUTH_DERIVE \
 	WOLFBOOT_ATTESTATION_IAK \
 	WOLFBOOT_ATTESTATION_TEST \
 	WOLFBOOT_UDS_UID_FALLBACK_FORTEST \