Document WOLFBOOT_SKIP_BOOT_VERIFY

pull/715/head
Brett Nicholas 2026-03-04 12:48:51 -07:00 committed by Daniele Lacamera
parent 4b751521e0
commit bd4bc1970a
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@ -286,6 +286,34 @@ make clean && make
make test-sim-self-update-monolithic
```
#### Skipping boot image verification
When wolfBoot is used together with the [self-header](#self-header-persisting-the-bootloader-manifest)
and [monolithic updates](#monolithic-updates) features, an external verifier such as
[wolfHSM](wolfHSM.md) can verify the combined bootloader+application payload before wolfBoot runs.
In this scenario, wolfBoot's own boot-time verification is redundant and can be skipped as a
performance optimization.
Setting `WOLFBOOT_SKIP_BOOT_VERIFY=1` in the build configuration disables both the integrity (hash)
and authenticity (signature) checks that wolfBoot normally performs on the boot image at startup.
**WARNING: This option completely disables boot-time firmware verification. It is only safe to use
when ALL of the following conditions are met:**
- The self-header feature is enabled, so the bootloader manifest is persisted alongside the
application image
- Monolithic updates are enabled, so the bootloader and application are always updated together as a
single payload
- An external entity (e.g. an HSM running wolfHSM) is guaranteed to verify the full monolithic
payload before wolfBoot boots
**Using this option outside of this specific scenario removes all boot-time authenticity and integrity
guarantees and is not secure.**
Note that this option only affects verification of the boot image at startup. Firmware updates
staged in the update partition are still fully verified (signature and integrity) before being
installed, regardless of this setting.
### Incremental updates (aka: 'delta' updates)
wolfBoot supports incremental updates, based on a specific older version. The sign tool