Address Copilot review comments

tools/keytools/sign.c

@@ -2516,16 +2516,27 @@ static int base_diff(const char *f_base, uint8_t *pubkey, uint32_t pubkey_sz, in
     if (CMD.cert_chain_file != NULL) {
         struct stat cc_stat;
         if ((stat(CMD.cert_chain_file, &cc_stat) == 0) &&
-            (cc_stat.st_size >= 0) &&
-            ((uintmax_t)cc_stat.st_size <= (uintmax_t)UINT32_MAX)) {
-            uint32_t required_space = header_required_size(1,
-                (uint32_t)cc_stat.st_size, 0);
-            if (CMD.header_sz < required_space) {
-                uint32_t new_size = 256;
-                while (new_size < required_space) {
-                    new_size *= 2;
+            (cc_stat.st_size >= 0)) {
+            if ((uintmax_t)cc_stat.st_size > (uintmax_t)UINT16_MAX) {
+                printf("Error: Certificate chain too large for TLV encoding "
+                    "(%ju > %u)\n", (uintmax_t)cc_stat.st_size, UINT16_MAX);
+                goto cleanup;
+            }
+            else {
+                uint32_t required_space = header_required_size(1,
+                    (uint32_t)cc_stat.st_size, 0);
+                if (CMD.header_sz < required_space) {
+                    uint32_t new_size = 256;
+                    while (new_size < required_space) {
+                        if (new_size > (UINT32_MAX / 2U)) {
+                            printf("Error: Header size overflow while sizing "
+                                "certificate chain\n");
+                            goto cleanup;
+                        }
+                        new_size *= 2;
+                    }
+                    CMD.header_sz = new_size;
                 }
-                CMD.header_sz = new_size;
             }
         }
     }

tools/squashelf/test-range-overflow.py

@@ -72,29 +72,28 @@ def run(squashelf, infile, outfile, rng):
 
 def main():
     squashelf = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "./squashelf"
-    d = tempfile.mkdtemp()
     rc = 0
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+        # 1) Overflow segment: p_paddr + p_memsz - 1 wraps below p_paddr, so the
+        #    wrapped end (~0x4fe) is inside [0, 0x1000] even though the real span
+        #    covers the whole address space. It MUST be excluded (non-zero exit,
+        #    no output segment).
+        bad = os.path.join(d, "overflow.elf")
+        make_elf64(bad, paddr=0x500, memsz=UINT64_MAX)
+        if run(squashelf, bad, os.path.join(d, "bad.out"), "0x0-0x1000") == 0:
+            print("FAIL: overflow segment was wrongly included by range filter")
+            rc = 1
+        else:
+            print("PASS: overflow segment excluded")
 
-    # 1) Overflow segment: p_paddr + p_memsz - 1 wraps below p_paddr, so the
-    #    wrapped end (~0x4fe) is inside [0, 0x1000] even though the real span
-    #    covers the whole address space. It MUST be excluded (non-zero exit,
-    #    no output segment).
-    bad = os.path.join(d, "overflow.elf")
-    make_elf64(bad, paddr=0x500, memsz=UINT64_MAX)
-    if run(squashelf, bad, os.path.join(d, "bad.out"), "0x0-0x1000") == 0:
-        print("FAIL: overflow segment was wrongly included by range filter")
-        rc = 1
-    else:
-        print("PASS: overflow segment excluded")
-
-    # 2) Regression guard: a normal in-range segment must still be kept.
-    good = os.path.join(d, "ok.elf")
-    make_elf64(good, paddr=0x500, memsz=0x100)
-    if run(squashelf, good, os.path.join(d, "good.out"), "0x0-0x1000") != 0:
-        print("FAIL: normal in-range segment was dropped")
-        rc = 1
-    else:
-        print("PASS: normal in-range segment kept")
+        # 2) Regression guard: a normal in-range segment must still be kept.
+        good = os.path.join(d, "ok.elf")
+        make_elf64(good, paddr=0x500, memsz=0x100)
+        if run(squashelf, good, os.path.join(d, "good.out"), "0x0-0x1000") != 0:
+            print("FAIL: normal in-range segment was dropped")
+            rc = 1
+        else:
+            print("PASS: normal in-range segment kept")
 
     sys.exit(rc)
 

tools/tpm/rot.c

@@ -161,17 +161,20 @@ static int TPM2_Boot_SecureROT_Example(TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH authHandle, word32 nvBase
         }
         if (rc == 0) {
             digestSz = nvPublic.dataSize;
+            word32 digestReadSz;
             /* dataSize is supplied by the TPM over the bus; clamp it to the
              * digest buffer so a malicious/emulated TPM (or a pre-existing NV
              * index larger than the hash) cannot overflow digest[] during the
              * read-back below, which uses digestSz as the copy count. */
             if (digestSz > (int)sizeof(digest))
                 digestSz = (int)sizeof(digest);
+            digestReadSz = (word32)digestSz;
 
             /* Read access */
             printf("Reading NV 0x%x public key hash\n", nv.handle.hndl);
             rc = wolfTPM2_NVReadAuth(&dev, &nv, nv.handle.hndl,
-                digest, (word32*)&digestSz, 0);
+                digest, &digestReadSz, 0);
+            digestSz = (int)digestReadSz;
         }
         if (rc == 0) {
             printf("Read Public Key Hash (%d)\n", digestSz);

tools/unit-tests/unit-sign-delta-cert-inv-off.py

@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ def find_tlv_u32(data, want_type, scan_end):
             continue
         length = data[p + 2] | (data[p + 3] << 8)
         if htype == want_type:
+            if length != 4 or p + 4 + length > scan_end:
+                return None
             return struct.unpack("<I", data[p + 4:p + 4 + length])[0]
         p += 4 + length
     return None