The wolfSSL bump to master 4aa1ad7a5 wraps all of coding.h in
"#ifndef NO_CODING". That block also holds the auto-enable that turns
WOLFSSL_KEY_GEN into WOLFSSL_BASE64_ENCODE, so wolfBoot configurations
that set both WOLFSSL_KEY_GEN (SECURE_PKCS11) and NO_CODING lost the
Base64_Encode() declaration -- and coding.c compiles to nothing under
NO_CODING, so the definition is gone too. settings.h still derives
WOLFSSL_DER_TO_PEM from WOLFSSL_KEY_GEN, so asn.c kept compiling
wc_DerToPemEx() and failed with an implicit declaration of
Base64_Encode(). This broke every TrustZone and PKCS11 target.
wolfBoot never emits PEM, so define WOLFSSL_NO_DER_TO_PEM whenever
NO_CODING is set rather than pulling base64 back in. The check sits
after the HAVE_FIPS block, which may undef NO_CODING. wolfTPM's
wc_DerToPem() callers are themselves guarded by WOLFSSL_DER_TO_PEM, so
they simply drop their optional PEM encoding path.
Separately, the update grows wolfboot by 8-136 bytes depending on the
configuration, so re-measure every test-size-all entry with the CI
container and record the new sizes.
After writing both partitions, re-read BOOT and confirm it still
holds TESTING, so a backend that routes both IDs to the same
trailer is caught (previously each read followed its own write).
Verification: make -C tools/unit-tests unit-custom-trailer-nopart
exits 0; suite runs 1 check, 0 failures.
Replace EXIT_SUCCESS/EXIT_FAILURE with 0/1; the test does not
include <stdlib.h> and does not need the named macros.
Verification: make -C tools/unit-tests unit-custom-trailer-nopart
exits 0; suite runs 1 check, 0 failures.
test_fixed_partition_apis_absent only asserted the build config
(0==0 when WOLFBOOT_FIXED_PARTITIONS is off), which the successful
compile of the same target already proves. Reviewer nit.
Verification: make -C tools/unit-tests unit-custom-trailer-nopart
exits 0; suite runs 1 check, 0 failures.
- libwolfboot.c: keep the partition state APIs (set/get_partition_state)
available to CUSTOM_PARTITION_TRAILER / WOLFBOOT_NO_PARTITIONS builds;
guard the fixed-partition APIs (sector flags, erase, trigger, success)
behind WOLFBOOT_FIXED_PARTITIONS. Add the unit-custom-trailer-nopart
compile target to lock in that configuration.
- unit-p1021-fcm-bytes.c: add program tests for status 0x81 (fail) and
0x00 (write-protected), asserting no later page is programmed.
- unit-p1021-erase-advance.c: add an erase test for status 0x00
(write-protected), asserting failure before advancing to the next block.
- hal/nxp_p1021.c: fix ONFI status polarity (bit 0 set = fail, bit 7
clear = protected; was checking bits 0+1 set = success)
- src/libwolfboot.c: move partition state APIs under HAVE_PARTITION_TRAILERS
so CUSTOM_PARTITION_TRAILER without WOLFBOOT_FIXED_PARTITIONS links
- src/x86/ata.c: do not zeroize DMA buffer when another async op is
in progress (buffer still owned by first command's transfer)
- unit-p1021-fcm-bytes/erase-advance: update mocks to ONFI status bytes
- unit-update-ram-custom-trailer: add BOOT selection assertion via
mock_max_read_addr, PID-suffixed temp files, unlink in cleanup
- unit-update-ram-nofixed-noramboot: unlink PID-specific temp files
- src/x86/ata.c: verify PxCI is clear in the TFES path before scrubbing
the DMA buffer (symmetric with the success path; prevents scrubbing
while the HBA may still reference the buffer)
- unit-update-ram-nofixed-noramboot.c: append PID to /tmp filenames to
avoid collisions under parallel make -j or shared runners
Add HAVE_PARTITION_TRAILERS macro (set when WOLFBOOT_FIXED_PARTITIONS or
CUSTOM_PARTITION_TRAILER is defined) and use it to gate the TESTING state
transition in update_ram.c. Previously the gate was WOLFBOOT_FIXED_PARTITIONS
only, so targets using custom partition trailers never transitioned from
UPDATING to TESTING, allowing rollback to older versions.
Add unit-update-ram-custom-trailer test covering the CUSTOM_PARTITION_TRAILER
path with mocked get/set_trailer_at callbacks.
GCC 14+ defaults to gnu23, where glibc string.h defines memchr
and memcpy as _Generic macros that clash with wolfBoot's own
declarations in tests that #include a .c file (unit-string).
gnu17 matches the CI toolchain default.
keygen_die() (F-9767) calls wc_FreeRng(); the test mocks
keygen.c's wolfCrypt dependencies one by one and was missing
this one, breaking the unit_tests and test_external_libs jobs.
security_command_passphrase() only wiped the static DMA buffer on the
synchronous path; in async mode (ata_security_erase_unit) the
passphrase stayed resident in the file-static buffer for the rest of
the boot, since ata_cmd_complete_async() never scrubbed it.
Add a scrub_buffer flag to the async state, set it when the command
goes in flight (or wipe immediately if it never started), and scrub in
ata_cmd_complete_async() on both the success and task-file-error exits,
once the HBA has retired the command.
Covered by two new unit tests: scrub after async completion and after
an async port error; the in-flight state is asserted unscrubbed.
Reported by Fenrir.
The TPM NV auth copy and the HMAC session state lived on the
stack until process teardown. Zeroize both at the common exit
label after the TPM device is unloaded, on success and error
paths alike.
keygen_ed25519/ed448/lms/xmss/ml_dsa have the same bypass as
the RSA/ECC helpers: exit() from their cleanup labels skips
main()'s wc_FreeRng(). Route their failure exits through
keygen_die() as well.
keygen_rsa/keygen_ecc exit() from their own cleanup labels,
bypassing main()'s wc_FreeRng() and leaving DRBG state resident.
Add keygen_die() that frees and zeroes the RNG before exit and
use it in the two helpers' failure paths.
The error path returned before the common wc_FreeRng(), leaving
DRBG state on the stack. Route it through the shared cleanup and
guard the sign call so hash_type/mgf are only used when set.
The F-12922 test checks fallback to the lower version, but the
TCase was still named "rollback denied" from before the fix,
describing the opposite behavior.
ext_flash_erase() now checks NAND_STATUS_FAIL | NAND_STATUS_WPS
(F-12881), but the sed extraction rule only pulled the command
defines, so the unit_tests CI jobs failed to compile the test.
pkcs11_crypto_init() tore down the session on failure but left the
pre-populated pkcs11_pin credential in retained bootloader memory
after the handoff. Wipe it in the failure path, same as the deinit
path (F-12114). Regression test in unit-pkcs11-pin-zeroize: login
rejected -> init fails -> every pin byte is zero.
The version gate in the retry loop panicked whenever the selected
candidate failed verification and the fallback partition carried a
lower version, even though that image is valid and signed. A single
corrupted higher-version image bricked the device instead of falling
back. The gate only ever fired on the failure path (candidate
selection already prefers the higher version), so remove it; the
TESTING-state anti-rollback check in wolfBoot_dualboot_candidate()
still guards the confirmed-update path.
wolfBoot_start() zeroed os_image once, before the retry loop, so the
fallback iteration kept the stale img->hdr of the failed partition and
wolfBoot_open_image_address() (which only adopts load_address when
hdr is NULL) re-verified the wrong image. The external header cache
had the same problem: it kept the first image opened.
memset the struct and invalidate the EXT_FLASH header cache at the
top of each loop iteration, per the documented precondition of
wolfBoot_open_image_address().
Add unit-update-ram-nofixed-noramboot: the non-fixed-partition,
non-RAMBOOT (XIP) layout where load_address varies per retry, with
fallback tests both directions plus candidate-selection checks.
The mock abandoned a faulting erase/program whole, so half-written sectors
went untested; it can now tear one part-way and the sweep runs every crash
point at 1/4, 1/2 and 3/4. An empty read must also leave the node in place
with size 8, so a lost or torn header no longer passes as an empty rewrite.
The crash == ops iteration injects nothing, so it must read back new_p; the
empty/absent branch was letting a silently lost complete rewrite pass. Also
assert the uninjected baseline write lands before measuring against it.
Under MOCK_STALE_CACHE the shadow is the flash array and vault_base only the
CPU's view, so restoring vault_base alone let the power cycle copy the last
iteration's result back: no crash case started from the old generation.
vault_obj_read() now separates "object absent" from a failed read, so the
power-fail test rejects a corrupted vault instead of accepting any negative.
hal_cache_invalidate() shrank 120 -> 44 bytes; the 48 it still costs every
STM32F407 build is folded into the test-size-all limits.
The store commits sectors with hal_flash_erase()/hal_flash_write() and
then reads them back through the memory map - sector_ptr(),
cache_get_sector()'s refill, and the raw magic reads in check_vault().
On a part that caches flash reads (STM32 ICACHE) those reads can return
pre-erase bytes. check_vault() is the worst case: a stale magic there
does not merely read wrong, it triggers restore_backup() or a full vault
re-initialisation, losing the token.
Adds power-fail injection to the flash mock and a test that cuts power at
every flash operation of a rewrite window, asserting the object always reads
back as the whole old payload, the whole new payload, or empty. Fails at
op 3 without this fix, passes with it.
unit-pkcs11_store 10/10; full unit-tests suite green.
test_concurrent_reader_sees_pending_writes only ever read from flash:
the reader's Store_Open calls check_vault(), which flushes the sector
cache, so the sector_ptr() read path in Store_Read was never exercised
and the test passed identically against the pre-PR memcpy.
Write more on the still-open writer after the reader is open. That
batch lands only in the sector cache, so the reader can only see it
through the cached read path and the live header size; a flash-only or
snapshot-size read returns EOF here. Verified: the new assertion fails
against the pre-fix store (ret == 0) and passes with the live-size fix.
Addresses PR #873 review comments (wolfSSL-Fenrir-bot,
tools/unit-tests/unit-pkcs11_store.c:587, both near-duplicate findings).
Store_Read and Store_Write used handle->size, a snapshot taken at
Store_Open. The payload path reads through the sector cache, so once
another window's batch (e.g. a write-open truncation) sat pending in
the cache, the window saw live erased data under a stale size and
returned 0xFF bytes past the true end instead of EOF. Pre-PR the size
was read live from the flash header on every call, so the PR regressed
that case.
Read the size from the same (possibly cached) header sector the payload
comes from, via store_live_size(), so size and data share one source of
truth. Drop the now-dead handle->size snapshot; update_store_size()
only writes the cached header node.
Addresses PR #873 review comment (wolfSSL-Fenrir-bot,
src/pkcs11_store.c:711).
check_vault() dropped the shared sector cache on every vault
validation, silently losing the pending writes of any still-open
window when another handle was opened or an object removed
(MAX_OPEN_STORES allows 16). Flush instead - the atomic header-last
commit - so an in-flight batch only gets an earlier commit point;
its data is never discarded.
wolfPKCS11_Store_Read() now reads through sector_ptr() like every
other read in the file, so a sector still in the cache can never be
read stale against a live size.
Add unit tests covering the interleaved-window data loss and a
concurrent reader observing a pending write; both fail without the
check_vault fix.
Every wolfPKCS11 field write flushed the payload sector and the header
sector to flash (2 erases + 2 programs of a full sector each), and the
token store re-serializes all objects per C_CreateObject/C_DestroyObject,
so those calls cost hundreds of sector erases and tens of seconds on
flash with slow erase times.
Cache modified sectors in RAM and commit them together when the store
window closes:
- sector cache sized to the worst-case span of one object plus the
header sector (WOLFBOOT_PKCS11_STORE_CACHE_SECTORS), LRU eviction
when exceeded
- header sector commits last, so a committed header is the atomic
commit point of the batch: power failure during a flush leaves the
flash in either the pre-batch or the post-batch state
- per-commit backup sector write preserved, keeping recovery of the
sector in flight at failure time
- delete_object commits on return (durability contract, unit-tested)
- nodes table, bitmap, payload ids and the live object size
(handle->size) are read from the cache when the sector is dirty
Measured on an STM32H5 with 8KB sectors, wolfPKCS11 in the secure
world: C_CreateObject 1.5s -> 0.15s, C_DestroyObject 1.3s -> 0.12s,
456 -> 40 sector erases per create, and the count no longer scales
with the number of objects in the token.
PKCS11_STORE_STATS (off by default) adds flash-activity counters and a
test-app bench to quantify store traffic: make PKCS11_STORE_STATS=1.
The new unaligned tests passed against the pre-fix HAL (identical
final bytes), so the alignment fix had no regression coverage. Mock
hal_flash_wait_complete now diffs the flash per program window and
asserts the changed bytes fit in one aligned unit; the 20-byte
unaligned test goes red on the pre-fix HAL (l5: bytes 4-11 across two
8-byte units, u5: bytes 4-19 across two 16-byte units).
hal/stm32wb.c: dedicated RCC_CFGR_SWS_{MSI,MASK} macros for the
clock-switch confirmation wait; SW/SWS encodings verified identical
in RM0434 6.4.3 and the STM32WB55 SVD.
unit-stm32u5-write.c: START_TEST brace on the next line, matching
the file and the unit-suite convention.
An unaligned starting address split the four word stores across two
16-byte program units, leaving partial quad-words that set
FLASH_SR_WDW and hang the wait for completion. Align the destination
down to the unit, read-modify-write the whole unit, and store through
the aligned pointer. The unit test gains unaligned-start cases.
hal_flash_write() stored both words of the 64-bit program unit
relative to the caller's address, so a write starting inside a unit
split the two stores across two units: the flash has no 32-bit
program mode, so nothing is programmed and the second store faults
on alignment. Align the destination down to the unit, take the bytes
outside the requested span from the unit itself, and store through
the aligned pointer, as hal/stm32h5.c does. The TrustZone claim is
unchanged: it is page-granular and already covers every non-secure
byte the aligned program touches.
Extend unit-stm32l5-write with unaligned-start cases. The host data
model cannot observe the program-unit split (pre-fix the bytes land
identically), so these pin the fixed layout: bytes before the
request preserved, nothing past it touched.
The HAL contract is absolute (0x08000000-based) addresses, as the
erase path and every NVM caller use, but the double-word fast path
added the flash base on top and targeted an address space past the
flash. The read-modify-write path located its unit from the request
base indexed by i/4, landing in the wrong 8-byte unit once a request
started inside one. Both paths now program the 8-byte unit at
(address + i), and the now-dead FLASHMEM_ADDRESS_SPACE define is
gone.
Add unit-stm32c0-write: runs the extracted hal_flash_write() against
a host register/flash model with a second mapping standing in for
the wrong address space (4/5 checks fail pre-fix, 5/5 pass post-fix).
The final image-size check re-derived the low-memory limit with a
uint32 subtraction and no ordering check, so an inverted tolum
wrapped into a near-2^32 limit and accepted any image. Compare the
tolum/load_address ordering in 32-bit (low-memory) form when
computing slot_max, and reuse that validated value in the check.
Add a unit test for the inverted-tolum case (fails closed, both
slots rejected).
The PKCS#11 and PSA store Remove paths invalidated the metadata and
freed the bitmap slot but left the payload in flash, so removed keys
stayed recoverable by a physical reader. Both Remove paths now call
erase_object_payload() before invalidating the metadata; the existing
sector read-modify-write preserves neighboring slots. Raw-flash
deletion tests added to both unit suites.
Cap the library fw_size clamp at UINT32_MAX (a > 4 GiB file would
otherwise truncate to a small value), say 'restore' not 'store' in the
scatter-restore error message, and print stdout as well as stderr in
the compile-check scripts on failure.
The ELF scatter destination is the exec region, which sits outside the
boot partition that stores the signed ELF. Bounding it to the boot
partition rejected every legitimate segment (aurix exec is below boot,
sim scatter is above it) and bricked corruption recovery. The paddr is
covered by the image signature verified before this restore path and the
overflow check keeps it from wrapping, so no destination bound is needed;
this also matches the check function, which bounds no destination.
If the snap allocation fails but the work allocation succeeds, the
initialisation loop never runs and nsc_tmpl_free() would release
indeterminate work[].pValue pointers. Zero work[] right after the
allocation (before the NULL check) so every path that reaches the
free hands out initialised, NULL pValue entries.
keystore_get_size() returns -1 on invalid or oversized OTP slot
data; storing it in uint16_t made -1 become 65535, which passed the
hdrSz <= 0 check and was fed to the ECC/RSA parser as a 65535-byte
read from the keystore buffer. Keep it as int and reject values
<= 0 or above KEYSTORE_PUBKEY_SIZE.
Daniele Lacamera
David Garske
Brett Nicholas