5 Commits (ef03cf007f26cb3fa19786de1e095d8ca65fc1dd)

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Daniele Lacamera	e0f271bfd5	F-4715: bound GPT partition-entry array size before CRC scan in disk_open ... disk_open() computed bytes_left = n_part * array_sz from the GPT header and scanned the whole declared partition-entry array (one disk_read per 512-byte chunk) to compute its CRC32 *before* comparing against ptable.part_crc. Both n_part and array_sz are taken verbatim from the GPT header, whose only gate is a header CRC32 the attacker can freely recompute. A crafted header with e.g. n_part=0xFFFFFFFF forces ~10^9 disk reads before the mismatch is detected: a pre-auth denial of service that can trip a watchdog and block boot. Reject the header when n_part * array_sz exceeds GPT_MAX_PART_ENTRIES (128, the UEFI default) * GPT_PART_ENTRY_SIZE before entering the scan loop. The bound is generous enough for any standard table (128 * 128 = 16 KiB) and for the existing oversized-array test cases, but caps the scan at 64 sectors. Add a regression test that crafts a header with a valid header CRC and an 8 MB declared array and asserts disk_open performs no partition-array reads.	2026-06-10 21:01:16 +02:00
Daniele Lacamera	dfc7656071	Validate GPT partition array CRC ... F/3045	2026-04-29 12:10:02 +02:00
Daniele Lacamera	776378ca78	Preparing release v2.8.0 + update copyright	2026-04-16 13:11:56 +02:00
David Garske	0292da582b	Refactor disk.c for generic use. Wired up uSD read for MBR/GPT	2025-12-24 18:31:55 +01:00
David Garske	e055585942	Support for Microchip PolarFire SoC (MPFS250)	2025-12-24 18:31:55 +01:00