- LoadRootCaPemBuffer() loads every block a PEM CA buffer holds as a
root CA, skipping the ones that fail. It returns WS_SUCCESS when
any loaded, WS_PARSE_E when all failed, and WS_BAD_FILE_E when the
buffer holds no block.
- A block runs header to footer with the next header capping the
footer search, so wc_PemToDer() gets the block rather than the rest
of the buffer. A header that nothing closes is skipped and the walk
resumes at its end; each form's header is re-sought only from
behind the one just read.
- A block takes the plain or the trusted form, whichever header leads
picking the type. FindInBuffer() searches a length-delimited
buffer, so an embedded NUL does not end the search.
- wolfSSH_ProcessBuffer() routes a PEM BUFTYPE_CA there and, like
DoPemCert(), gives WS_BAD_FILETYPE_E for the trusted form as a
certificate; SniffCertForm() reads its header as X.509 PEM.
- internal.h defines WOLFSSH_HAVE_TRUSTED_CERT_PEM under
WOLFSSH_CERTS with wolfSSL 5.8.0 or newer and declares
IsTrustedCertPem(); ssh.h documents the cert buffer calls.
- tests/api.c adds catBuffers(), makeTrustedPem() and
assertCaInstalled(), with tests for the bundle, trusted file and
trusted ReadCert paths.
- Assemble the split offset with wResolveOffset() in the Harmony wPread
and wPwrite, and seek with the resolved value.
- Assemble the split offset with wResolveOffset() in the Zephyr wPread
and wPwrite, and seek with the resolved value.
- Define WOLFSSH_MAX_FILE_OFFSET as 0x7FFFFFFF in the Harmony block, so
the ceiling comes from SYS_FS_FileSeek's int32_t offset rather than
from off_t.
- Add test_PreadPwriteOffsetCeiling() covering ports whose seek type
cannot reach 4 GiB, including a read back at an in-range offset.
- Add test_ResolveOffset() covering offset assembly, both sides of the
ceiling, and the NULL guards.
Issue: F-8823
- test.h's static Base16_Decode collides with wolfSSL's public one
when coding.h lands first, breaking --enable-tpm builds.
- Include coding.h in test.h, keeping the local copy only when
WOLFSSL_BASE16 is absent; --enable-wolfssh alone does not set it.
- api.c includes coding.h too, dropping its hand-declared
Base64_Encode_NoNl, which would now be a duplicate.
- The byte-count branch of HighwaterCheck() had no coverage. Exercise
the boundary at the mark, the once-per-epoch flag that keeps the
callback from firing a second time, the receive side, and a mark of
0 disabling the check.
Issue: F-6978
- DoUserAuthRequestEcc() skipped the curve name in the public key blob
and imported the point with wc_ecc_import_x963(), which picks the
curve from the point length, so the key did not have to be on the
curve the declared algorithm names.
- Derive the curve from pk->publicKeyType with NameToId() and
wcPrimeForId(), require the blob's curve name to equal
PrimeNameForId() for that id, and import with
wc_ecc_import_x963_ex() pinned to that curve.
- The import's error check sat outside the success guard, so it
rewrote any earlier error as WS_CRYPTO_FAILED. Scope it to the
import itself so the parse and algorithm-match errors keep their
own codes.
- Add test_EccUserAuthCurveMismatch, which offers a blob naming one
curve under another algorithm and expects the request to fail.
Issue: F-6979
- IsMessageAllowedClient() gated the post-userauth rejection on
connectState >= CONNECT_KEYED, so every state below it allowed
msgid 80 and above.
- A client in the pre-key-exchange DoReceive() loops accepted an
unencrypted CHANNEL_OPEN, created the channel and replied with
CHANNEL_OPEN_CONF.
- Add a state sweep over the connection-protocol range and a full
DoReceive() of a plaintext CHANNEL_OPEN from a pre-auth state.
Issue: F-7628
- cover the ID_OSSH_CERT_* key IDs in wolfSSH_KEY_clean
- zeroize the key signature struct before freeing it
- add a unit test for the RSA OpenSSH-certificate ID
Issue: F-7519
- zero the response arrays and stop filling after the first
failed read, tracking only the slots populated
- release the previous round's responses on each INFO_REQUEST
- add auth.test coverage for EOF stdin and a second round
Issue: F-7515, F-7516
- fail ParseCertChain when the peer sends a zero cert count
- only set isCert when a leaf was actually parsed
- add a ParseLeafCert test hook and zero-count unit test
Issue: F-7517
- add ChannelRequestIs() comparing the type length as well
- use it for all nine handled request types, so truncated,
empty and NUL-padded types are rejected
- cover "sh", "sub", empty and "shell\0AAAA" in unit tests
Issue: F-7217
- gate the multi-block loop on ret so the first wc_HashFinal
result is not discarded
- add a SHA-256 two-block key expansion known-answer test
Issue: F-7507
- add sftp_retry_remove()/sftp_retry_close() so Close and Remove are
driven to completion instead of abandoned mid-operation
- split the retry predicate: Open and SendWritePacket keep state only on
WS_WANT_READ/WS_WANT_WRITE, LS adds WS_REKEYING, Close and Remove gate
on NoticeError()
- assert the staging close; keep the post-read cleanup best effort, as
the reads are skipped rather than completed on WS_REKEYING
- route the WOLFSSH_TEST_INTERNAL write cleanup through the helpers
- shrink the staging chunk to 512 bytes
- Clamp the staging write chunk to the bytes remaining and derive the
try cap from the chunk count, so the loop lands exactly on
WOLFSSH_MAX_SFTP_RW for any value of the macro.
- Retry the staging Open and the LS on WS_WANT_READ, WS_WANT_WRITE,
and WS_REKEYING, matching the rekey tolerance used elsewhere in the
function.
- Assert the staging Open, the LS, and the listing match rather than
keying the read block on them, so neither a failed create nor a
connection stuck in WANT/REKEYING until the try cap can drop the
read coverage without failing the test.
- Remove any stale file before the staging Open, so the reads never
target a file staged by a prior aborted run.
- Size the read buffer from WOLFSSH_MAX_SFTP_RW, the amount staged and
the largest amount read, instead of the listed file size, and drop
the listed-size guard on the 18 byte read.
- Guard the listing name compare against a NULL fName.
- Verify every read returns the staged fill byte, not just a valid
length; the check is a macro so a failure reports the calling
read's line.
- Opening the listing's first entry raced with tests/testsuite.test,
which creates and removes files in the same directory under
"make -j check"; the entry could be gone before the open.
- Stage the read target over SFTP, select it from the listing by name,
and remove it afterward.
- Check the listing with AssertNotNull; a missing entry used to skip
the whole test body.
- Track the scpFileName allocation size in a new scpFileNameCap field,
so GetScpFileName() and ScpCheckForRename() reuse the buffer whenever
the name plus its terminator fits, instead of testing against the
previous name length
- Pass scpFileNameCap to the send callback, which writes into
scpFileName and needs the capacity; scpFileNameSz is now the name
length on every path, including the source path
- Free and reallocate the transfer buffer in ScpSourceInit(), clearing
the size fields alongside the pointers they describe
- Wrap a long line in ScpProcessEntry()
- Add test_ScpGetFileName covering the reuse-vs-realloc branch, the
exact-fit boundary, a grow-by-one that catches an off-by-one in the
reuse condition, and a source-path buffer holding no name yet
- Add test_wolfSSH_SCP_RecursiveTwoFiles, a real "scp -r" transfer of
two files, covering the scpFileHeaderSent reset on the recursive
path added in the duplicate-header fix; it clears leftovers from an
aborted run up front and bounds its recv so a regression fails
instead of hanging. Not built on Windows, where a recursive transfer
through the default callbacks does not reproduce the sent file
- Gate header on new scpFileHeaderSent flag, not scpFileOffset==0
- A send callback returning 0 bytes first no longer re-sends header
- Skip zero-length SCP_SEND_FILE send to avoid empty CHANNEL_DATA
- Abort on a second consecutive 0-byte send callback return with file
data outstanding; skipping the send would otherwise spin
SCP_SEND_FILE -> SCP_TRANSFER with no socket I/O
- Reset offset/bufferedSz/flags in ScpSourceInit for connection reuse
- Document the WS_CallbackScpSend contract, including when a 0 return
is valid, next to the typedef
- Add test_wolfSSH_SCP_SendZeroFirst regression (func_args scp_send hook)
- Zero func_args in kex.c/testsuite.c so the new scp_send field is not read uninitialized
Issue: ZD-22176
Raise a cryptographic minimum to current guidance. It rejects peers below
the new floor by design.
- Reject RSA user-authentication keys smaller than 2048 bits with
WS_CERT_KEY_SIZE_E, per NIST SP 800-131A. The floor is configurable via
a new WOLFSSH_RSA_MIN_KEY_BITS define (default 2048).
Issue: F-6517
- IdentifyAsn1Key() was called with a literal 1, so a public PEM decoded
by wc_PubKeyPemToDer() was run through the private-key decoders and
never identified.
- Add test_wolfSSH_ReadPublicKey_pem() covering a public RSA PEM read
through wolfSSH_ReadPublicKey_buffer(). The read itself only compiles
with WOLFSSH_TPM, so the test also asserts the isPrivate 0 vs 1
difference in IdentifyAsn1Key() directly, which every build runs.
Issue: F-7209
c[inSz-1] = 0 clobbered the last byte of the copied key data instead
of terminating the string after it, truncating public keys by one
character.
Issue: F-7205
Directory handles are tracked on ssh->dirList, a separate list from the
file handles, so the SFTP_AddFileHandle cap does not reach them. A peer
could loop on OPENDIR and grow that list until allocation failed.
- Add SFTP_DirHandleCapped() and check it in both RecvOpenDir branches
before the directory is opened or the name buffer allocated, so the
rejection has nothing to unwind. Refusal sends an SFTP status like the
existing permission-denied path rather than dropping the request.
- Reuse WOLFSSH_MAX_SFTP_HANDLES, so each list is bounded separately.
- Add wolfSSH_SFTP_TestDirHandleCount() and a regress test.
An authenticated peer could open SFTP file handles without limit,
growing ssh->fileList until allocation failed and making the linear
handle lookup progressively more expensive.
- Limit tracked file handles per session to WOLFSSH_MAX_SFTP_HANDLES
(default 64), bounding memory and the linear-lookup DoS surface.
- Check the cap in SFTP_FileHandleCapped() from both RecvOpen branches
after the path is resolved and before the file is opened. The open
flags derived from the request may carry O_CREAT and O_TRUNC, so
refusing after the open would create or truncate the target on a
request the peer is told failed. SFTP_AddFileHandle() keeps the check
as a backstop.
- Refuse with FTP_FAILURE "Too Many Open File Handles" so the peer can
tell a resource limit from a server malfunction.
- Add a regress test via wolfSSH_SFTP_TestFileHandleCount() covering the
cap, the refusal status reply, and that a refused open leaves the
target file untouched.
- GetNameListRaw stops at the first zero-length name and drops the
rest, matching OpenSSH's match_list() on a peer proposal.
- Its comma test lagged the index by one, folding a doubled comma into
the preceding name.
- An empty name-list is a list of zero names, not WS_BAD_ARGUMENT.
- Drop CountNameList. DoExtInfoServerSigAlgs parses into an array
capped at WOLFSSH_MAX_NAMELIST_CNT and allocates only on a match. A
list naming nothing it can sign with is advisory, RFC 8308 section
3.1, so it clears any recorded list instead of failing the
connection. The latest server-sig-algs wins, as in OpenSSH.
- Guard the list[0] reads in DoKexInit on a non-empty list. No change
today, an empty list fails to match first.
- Add wolfSSH_TestDoExtInfo and tests for both name-list paths, the
caps, lists of more than one algorithm, and a second EXT_INFO
superseding the recorded list, empty and unusable values included.
Issue: F-6817
- src/internal.c DoKexDhReply: drop the stale fuzz note on the signature
size. The size checks it pointed at stay.
- tests/unit.c: replace an em-dash with a comma, for ASCII-only sources.
None of the three paths this branch changed had coverage, which is why
make check passed both before and after the SendChannelData regression.
- unit: SendChannelData and SendChannelExtendedData with a peer maximum
packet size of 0 report WS_WINDOW_FULL, queue nothing, and leave
peerWindowSz alone. A zero-length send still succeeds.
- unit: BuildNameList terminates buf for an empty id list. The buffer is
poisoned first, so a missing terminator shows up as a wrong length
instead of depending on what the allocator handed back. Reaches the
static function through a new wolfSSH_TestBuildNameList hook.
- regress: a KEXDH_REPLY whose signature blob holds nothing but a name
length prefix is rejected with WS_BUFFER_E, pinning the bounded read
that replaced the hand-rolled name parse.
Each test was confirmed to fail with its fix reverted.
Issue: F-4586, F-4587, F-6525
Replace atoi() and strtoull() on peer-controlled numeric fields with
bounded, error-reporting parsers. atoi() has undefined behavior on
overflow and cannot signal malformed input. strtoull() is C99, so it is
unavailable on some ports, and it accepts a leading sign and leading
whitespace that the SCP header does not permit.
- #2881 src/wolfscp.c: add ScpParseUInt64 helper; parse SCP header
file size / mtime / atime with digit validation and overflow
rejection against a caller-supplied max, replacing the 3 strtoull
call sites from de23a694. Also rejects "+1", " 1" and "\t1" on all
three fields, and "-1" on the unbounded scpMTime and scpATime, which
had taken the wrapped 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF. The helper takes the field
length, dropping the temporary '\n' written over the separating space
at each call site, and with it the <stdint.h> include de23a694 had
added for UINT32_MAX.
- #2882 src/wolfterm.c: add parseArg helper using strtol; clamp
invalid/out-of-range VT100 params to 0, replacing 2 atoi call
sites (blocks peer "-1" wrapping to 0xFFFFFFFF). A param with bytes
left over after its digits, such as "12x", clamps to 0 rather than
parsing as a short value. strtol is C89 and needs no replacement.
Inside USE_WINDOWS_API, so not built on Linux or macOS. Also drop
the unused maxIdx from getArgs().
Extend test_ScpGetFileSize and test_ScpGetTimestamp in tests/unit.c for
the fields the new parser rejects but strtoull() accepted: a signed or
whitespace-padded field, an empty field, a field holding a NUL, and the
64-bit maximum and one past it on the timestamps. Drop the strtoull()
and ERANGE references from those test comments.
Issue: F-2881, F-2882
Move extDataBuffer from WOLFSSH to WOLFSSH_CHANNEL and give stderr real
back-pressure: charge the window on receipt, credit on read, never lose
the credit.
- Buffer stderr per channel; accumulate across packets instead of
overwriting unread data.
- Charge the window on receipt, replenish on read; reject data larger
than the advertised window.
- Route all credit through ChannelCreditWindow(): parks credit that
cannot go out (mid-rekey, failed send), suppresses zero-byte adjusts.
- Propagate hard credit-send failures on unknown extended-data types;
WS_WANT_WRITE and WS_OVERFLOW_E stay success.
- Add wolfSSH_Channel{Id,}ReadExt / SendExt; the stream_/extended_data_
pair stays first-channel-only.
- Drain SCP stderr in a loop; document the mandatory-drain contract.
Issue: F-864
Paul Adelsbach
Yosuke Shimizu
John Safranek
Emma Stensland
Ruby Martin
Mark Atwood