Provision the wrapped scalar with AES-GCM (iv + tag) instead of ECB, so a
tampered/corrupted/wrong-device blob fails at unwrap (AES_GCM_AUTH_E) rather than
yielding a garbage scalar. Matches the wc_Rtl8735b_EccKey iv/tag fields.
The HUK HMAC accumulation buffer now lives on the inner SHA-256 devCtx and relies
on the cryptocb copy/free ops so wc_HmacCopy/wc_HmacFree manage it correctly.
In-memory TLS 1.2 ECDHE-ECDSA handshake with the server certificate ECDSA P-256
signature produced on the HUK HW engine via a PK sign callback. The rest of TLS
(PRF/HMAC, record AES-GCM, ECDHE) stays in software: a whole-CTX WC_HUK_DEVID
would route TLS's own 32-byte HMAC keys (e.g. the P-256 ECDHE pre-master in the
PRF) to the HUK, whose key==seed semantics break key derivation. Validated on
RTL8735B silicon.
- Replace fabricated library-binary SHA-256/SHA-1 with all-zeros sentinels
in the pinned wolfssl-component samples (cdx/spdx + commercial variants);
a non-reproducible binary hash must not ship in a copyable sample.
- Recompute product bom-link checksums (CycloneDX bom hash + SPDX
externalDocumentRef) to match the edited component SBOMs.
- Give the SPDX tag-value document a distinct documentNamespace so it no
longer collides with the JSON serialization (SPDX 2.3 sec 3.5).
- Add licenses (GPL-3.0-only) to the wolfssl component in the product CDX
(NTIA minimum elements).
- Align conformity-assessment-route.md wording to Annex III "important" /
Annex IV "critical", dropping the "class II" label.
- Document the sentinel digest in SAMPLE-PROVENANCE.md.
validate.sh passes (cross-document checksums + pyspdxtools schema).
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
wolfSSL's own send callback returns WANT_WRITE when a send would block; this one returned WANT_READ. It currently works because both are -2, but the send path should use WANT_WRITE.
Pass a per-connection malloc'd descriptor instead of the address of the reused stack variable connfd, which the next accept() could overwrite before the thread dereferences it; the thread frees it after copying.
Set a non-success ret before each error goto so the function no longer returns WOLFSSL_SUCCESS on failure, using AES_GCM_AUTH_E when EVP_DecryptFinal_ex rejects a tampered GCM tag, and correct the mislabeled perror strings.
Plumb CRA_LICENSE_TEXT through generate-wolfssl-sbom.sh (gen-sbom/make
sbom hard-fail on a LicenseRef-* override without it); scope the
commercial relicense to the wolfssl package only; correct the stale
pkg:generic PURL claim; validate the embedded output dir; regenerate
pinned samples against gen-sbom 1.1 and re-pin product checksums.
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
Quote "$@" in gen-sbom --srcs (drop SC2068 disables), pass JSON paths to
python via env var in validate.sh to prevent filename injection, and fail
non-zero instead of warning when SBOM post-processing breaks. Rename the
user_settings.h guard to CRA_KIT_USER_SETTINGS_H, clarify the serialNumber
regex accepts v4 (product) and v5 (component) UUIDs, untrack the gitignored
embedded sample SBOMs, document the SHA-512 CBOM omission, and note sample
timestamp differences in SAMPLE-PROVENANCE.md.
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
Fail early when the wolfSSL tree version differs from the kit's pinned
VERSION instead of a cryptic cp error, trap-clean the embedded temp
defines file on all exit paths, add sh -n + shellcheck CI coverage for
the scripts, and use the standard file:./ relative form in the product
SBOM external references.
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
Emma Stensland
Paul Adelsbach
Zackery
David Garske
Sameeh Jubran
night1rider
Sean Parkinson
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Hosam Elkoulak