Spelling cleanup: configure.ac, ssl.c, ssl.h

pull/6069/head
jordan 2023-02-07 21:45:06 -06:00
parent ee12a5f0c6
commit cc791a7a53
3 changed files with 19 additions and 19 deletions

View File

@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ if test "$ENABLED_SP_ASM" != "no"
then
if test "$ENABLED_SP" = "no"
then
AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-sp-asm requries SP to be enabled.])
AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-sp-asm requires SP to be enabled.])
fi
if test "$ENABLED_SP" = ""
then
@ -4844,7 +4844,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([user-crypto],
if test "$ENABLED_USER_CRYPTO" = "yes" && test "$ENABLED_FIPS" = "yes"
then
AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot enable user crypto and fips, user crypto posibility of using code in fips boundary.])
AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot enable user crypto and fips, user crypto possibility of using code in fips boundary.])
fi
# Whitewood netRandom client library
@ -5325,7 +5325,7 @@ then
AM_CFLAGS="$AM_CFLAGS -DASN_BER_TO_DER"
fi
# Alternate certification chains, as oppossed to requiring full chain validataion.
# Alternate certification chains, as opposed to requiring full chain validation.
# Certificate validation behavior is relaxed, similar to openssl and
# browsers. Only the peer certificate must validate to a trusted
# certificate. Without this, all certificates sent by a peer must be
@ -7142,7 +7142,7 @@ if test "$ENABLED_FAST_RSA" = "yes"; then
esac
if test "$fastRSA_found" = "yes"; then
# was succesfull so add tested LDFLAGS to AM_ flags
# was successful so add tested LDFLAGS to AM_ flags
AM_LDFLAGS="${AM_LDFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS}"
AM_CPPFLAGS="${AM_CPPFLAGS} ${CPPFLAGS}"
IPPHEADERS="${srcdir}/IPP/include/*.h"
@ -7574,7 +7574,7 @@ then
ENABLED_TRUSTED_PEER_CERT=yes
fi
# dertermine if we have key validation mechanism
# determine if we have key validation mechanism
if test "x$ENABLED_ECC" != "xno" || test "x$ENABLED_RSA" = "xyes"
then
if test "x$ENABLED_ASN" = "xyes"

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@ -206,7 +206,7 @@
!defined(WOLFCRYPT_ONLY)
/* Convert shortname to NID.
*
* For OpenSSL compatability.
* For OpenSSL compatibility.
*
* This function shouldn't exist!
* Uses defines in wolfssl/openssl/evp.h.
@ -6228,7 +6228,7 @@ int AddCA(WOLFSSL_CERT_MANAGER* cm, DerBuffer** pDer, int type, int verify)
#else
/* ClientSession objects are lightweight (compared to
* WOLFSSL_SESSION) so to decrease chance that user will reuse
* thse wrong session, increase the ClientCache size. This will
* the wrong session, increase the ClientCache size. This will
* make the entire ClientCache about the size of one
* WOLFSSL_SESSION object. */
#define CLIENT_SESSIONS_MULTIPLIER 8
@ -11331,7 +11331,7 @@ WOLFSSL_SESSION* wolfSSL_get_session(WOLFSSL* ssl)
return ssl->session;
#else
if (ssl->options.side == WOLFSSL_CLIENT_END) {
/* On the client side we want to return a persistant reference for
/* On the client side we want to return a persistent reference for
* backwards compatibility. */
#ifndef NO_CLIENT_CACHE
if (ssl->clientSession) {
@ -15023,7 +15023,7 @@ ClientSession* AddSessionToClientCache(int side, int row, int idx, byte* serverI
}
else {
error = -1;
ClientCache[clientRow].nextIdx = 0; /* reset index as saftey */
ClientCache[clientRow].nextIdx = 0; /* reset index as safety */
WOLFSSL_MSG("Invalid client cache index! "
"Possible corrupted memory");
}
@ -15353,7 +15353,7 @@ int AddSessionToCache(WOLFSSL_CTX* ctx, WOLFSSL_SESSION* addSession,
}
#ifdef HAVE_SESSION_TICKET
else if (ticBuffUsed) {
/* Error occured. Need to clean up the ticket buffer. */
/* Error occurred. Need to clean up the ticket buffer. */
cacheSession->ticket = cacheSession->staticTicket;
cacheSession->ticketLenAlloc = 0;
cacheSession->ticketLen = 0;
@ -16777,7 +16777,7 @@ int wolfSSL_set_compression(WOLFSSL* ssl)
/* This function is currently the same as
wolfSSL_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms_noconf since we do not employ
the use of a wolfssl.cnf type configuration file and is only used for
OpenSSL compatability. */
OpenSSL compatibility. */
if (wolfSSL_add_all_algorithms() == WOLFSSL_FATAL_ERROR) {
return WOLFSSL_FATAL_ERROR;
@ -17587,7 +17587,7 @@ cleanup:
ctx->x509_store.cache = str->cache;
ctx->x509_store_pt = str; /* take ownership of store and free it
with CTX free */
ctx->cm->x509_store_p = ctx->x509_store_pt;/* CTX has onwership
ctx->cm->x509_store_p = ctx->x509_store_pt;/* CTX has ownership
and free it with CTX free*/
}
@ -38923,7 +38923,7 @@ void wolfSSL_THREADID_current(WOLFSSL_CRYPTO_THREADID* id)
return;
}
/* wolfSSL_THREADID_hash is provided as a compatible API with
* CRYPTO_THREADID_hash which returns a hash value calcurated from the
* CRYPTO_THREADID_hash which returns a hash value calculated from the
* specified thread id. However, CRYPTO_THREADID_hash API has been
* deprecated and no longer exists in the OpenSSL 1.0.0 or later.
* This API only works as a stub to returns 0. This behavior is
@ -39049,7 +39049,7 @@ int wolfSSL_CRYPTO_set_mem_ex_functions(void *(*m) (size_t, const char *, int),
#if defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA)
/**
* free allocated memory resouce
* free allocated memory resource
* @param str a pointer to resource to be freed
* @param file dummy argument
* @param line dummy argument
@ -39642,7 +39642,7 @@ int wolfSSL_RAND_egd(const char* nm)
ret = WOLFSSL_FATAL_ERROR;
}
#ifdef SHOW_SECRETS
else { /* print out entropy found only when no error occured */
else { /* print out entropy found only when no error occurred */
word32 i;
printf("EGD Entropy = ");
for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) {
@ -39706,7 +39706,7 @@ int wolfSSL_RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char* buf, int num)
{
int ret;
int hash;
byte secret[DRBG_SEED_LEN]; /* secret length arbitraily choosen */
byte secret[DRBG_SEED_LEN]; /* secret length arbitrarily chosen */
#ifndef WOLFSSL_NO_OPENSSL_RAND_CB
if (wolfSSL_RAND_InitMutex() == 0 && wc_LockMutex(&gRandMethodMutex) == 0) {
@ -42396,7 +42396,7 @@ int wolfSSL_FIPS_drbg_uninstantiate(WOLFSSL_DRBG_CTX *ctx)
void wolfSSL_FIPS_drbg_free(WOLFSSL_DRBG_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx != NULL) {
/* As saftey check if free'ing the default drbg, then mark global NULL.
/* As safety check if free'ing the default drbg, then mark global NULL.
* Technically the user should not call free on the default drbg. */
if (ctx == gDrbgDefCtx) {
gDrbgDefCtx = NULL;

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@ -3902,8 +3902,8 @@ enum {
* beside the group number. Please see the NIST PQC Competition's submitted
* papers for more details.
*
* LEVEL1 means that an attack on that parameter set would reqire the same
* or more resources as a key search on AES 128. LEVEL3 would reqire the
* LEVEL1 means that an attack on that parameter set would require the same
* or more resources as a key search on AES 128. LEVEL3 would require the
* same or more resources as a key search on AES 192. LEVEL5 would require
* the same or more resources as a key search on AES 256. None of the
* algorithms have LEVEL2 and LEVEL4 because none of these submissions