The TPM NV auth copy and the HMAC session state lived on the
stack until process teardown. Zeroize both at the common exit
label after the TPM device is unloaded, on success and error
paths alike.
The TPM-bus-supplied UINT16 nvPublic.dataSize was assigned to digestSz and
forwarded to wolfTPM2_NVReadAuth as the read byte count with no bound check.
wolfTPM2_NVReadAuthPolicy uses that count as the XMEMCPY length into the
caller's buffer with no separate capacity argument, so a malicious/emulated
TPM (or a pre-existing NV index larger than the hash) reporting dataSize > 64
overflows the 64-byte digest[WC_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] stack buffer.
Clamp digestSz to sizeof(digest) before the read. Stored values are key-hash
digests (<= WC_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE), so the clamp never truncates valid data.
Add a unit-rot-auth case driving nvPublic.dataSize=1000 through the existing
mocked harness, asserting the requested read count is clamped to the buffer.
* Added new `WOLFBOOT_TPM_SEAL` and `WOLFBOOT_TPM_SEAL_NV_BASE` config options.
* Added new `tools/tpm/policy_create` tool for assisting with creation of a policy digest. The sign keytool `--policy=file` signs the policy.
* Added new `WOLFBOOT_TPM_VERIFY` option to enable offloading of the asymmetric verification to the TPM. By default wolfCrypt will be used.
* Added example seal/unseal to update_flash for ARCH_SIM.
* Renamed `WOLFBOOT_TPM_KEYSTORE_NV_INDEX` to `WOLFBOOT_TPM_KEYSTORE_NV_BASE` to support multiple public keys.
* Refactored most TPM code into tpm.c.
* Refactored the keystore ROT to use new `wolfBoot_check_rot` API.
* Refactored the sign keytool to have a sign_digest function to allow signing firmware and policy for sealing/unsealing.
* Fix for make distclean && make using the wrong key tools.
Daniele Lacamera
gojimmypi
Brett Nicholas
David Garske
Marco Oliverio
Daniele Lacamera
Daniele Lacamera