The WOLFBOOT_DICE_HW exception assumed hardware DICE leaves the
secure world verify-only, but only the DICE attestation key runs on
the crypto engine: the secure PSA service still does software RSA/ECC
on keys created or imported through the IPC, so drop the exception and
let every WOLFCRYPT_SECURE_MODE fastmath build define
TFM_TIMING_RESISTANT.
The wolfSSL bump to master 4aa1ad7a5 wraps all of coding.h in
"#ifndef NO_CODING". That block also holds the auto-enable that turns
WOLFSSL_KEY_GEN into WOLFSSL_BASE64_ENCODE, so wolfBoot configurations
that set both WOLFSSL_KEY_GEN (SECURE_PKCS11) and NO_CODING lost the
Base64_Encode() declaration -- and coding.c compiles to nothing under
NO_CODING, so the definition is gone too. settings.h still derives
WOLFSSL_DER_TO_PEM from WOLFSSL_KEY_GEN, so asn.c kept compiling
wc_DerToPemEx() and failed with an implicit declaration of
Base64_Encode(). This broke every TrustZone and PKCS11 target.
wolfBoot never emits PEM, so define WOLFSSL_NO_DER_TO_PEM whenever
NO_CODING is set rather than pulling base64 back in. The check sits
after the HAVE_FIPS block, which may undef NO_CODING. wolfTPM's
wc_DerToPem() callers are themselves guarded by WOLFSSL_DER_TO_PEM, so
they simply drop their optional PEM encoding path.
Separately, the update grows wolfboot by 8-136 bytes depending on the
configuration, so re-measure every test-size-all entry with the CI
container and record the new sizes.
Secure-mode worlds (TZ_PSA/PKCS11/FWTPM/WOLFHSM) process private keys
in software, so a USE_FAST_MATH build of one of them must keep the
timing-resistant TFM path instead of falling back to WC_NO_HARDEN.
The old condition only covered software DICE; FIPS=1 already forces
SPMATH (options.mk M10) and all CMake presets set SPMATH, so no
shipped config changes - this closes the integrator Makefile gap.
WOLFBOOT_DICE_HW stays verify-only (requires WOLFCRYPT_TZ_PSA).
The test file headers ran to 20-40 lines of prose before the licence,
restating the whole finding and the harness design. Cut them to a short
paragraph on what broke and a short one on how the test reaches the
code. Same for the long inline blocks in the HAL and libwolfboot
changes.
Comments only; no functional change.
tfm.c never tests WC_NO_HARDEN, so dropping it enabled nothing; it only
un-silenced the advisory #warning in settings.h, which -Werror turns
into a build failure for any USE_FAST_MATH + WOLFCRYPT_TZ_PSA build.
Define TFM_TIMING_RESISTANT, which is what makes tfm.c constant time.
The comment justified WC_NO_HARDEN on the grounds that 'wolfBoot only
does public asymmetric operations'. That is not true for software
DICE: with WOLFCRYPT_TZ_PSA and no WOLFBOOT_DICE_HW, src/dice/dice.c
retrieves the private IAK (wolfboot_attest_get_private_key) and signs
the attestation claims with wc_CoseSign1_Sign_ex(), and arch.mk still
selects USE_FAST_MATH for those builds. A configuration maintainer
trusting the comment would have left the private-key signing path
without timing hardening.
Gate the definition to verify-only configurations: WC_NO_HARDEN is
now defined only when WOLFCRYPT_TZ_PSA is absent or WOLFBOOT_DICE_HW
is set (hardware DICE keeps signing in the crypto engine), and the
comment states the actual rationale.
Verified with a preprocessor probe: plain fast-math and hardware DICE
still get WC_NO_HARDEN; software DICE no longer does.
Four fixes needed by any wolfHSM client
- include/user_settings.h emitted "typedef struct WC_RNG WC_RNG;" whenever
WOLF_CRYPTO_CB && WC_NO_RNG, with no __ASSEMBLER__ guard, so a client built
with ARM thumb2 assembly failed to assemble wolfSSL's .S sources. Guard it.
- options.mk hardcoded WOLFHSM_CFG_COMM_DATA_LEN=5000 for every client. Make
it a variable (default unchanged) so ports whose transport slot is smaller
can override it.
- options.mk gated DEBUG_UART on the existence of the driver *object*, which
never exists on a clean tree, so DEBUG_UART was dropped on the very build
meant to enable it. Test for the source instead.
- Makefile unconditionally built an NVM key image with whnvmtool for
WOLFHSM_CLIENT=1. Add WOLFHSM_NVM_IMAGE=0 for ports that install the
verification key at boot instead.
* file level rename for ML-DSA
* Add missing source file to build system
* Update some macros
* Other minor fixes
* Update size limitations for some slight increases
- Integrates wolfPSA as psa_crypto/psa_store engine in TrustZone
- Provides interface to access APIs from non-secure mode
- Patches to enable wolfboot as TEE module in zephyr
- Patches to enable stm32h563-nucleo/ns as target in zephyr
- psa_crypto zephyr example using wolfboot/wolfPSA as secure engine
Daniele Lacamera
David Garske
Mattia Moffa
Aidan Garske
Marco Oliverio
Brett Nicholas
aidan garske
Tobias Frauenschläger
Thomas Cook
Paul Adelsbach