wolfssl-examples/ebpf/syscall-write-trace
Aidan Garske b41d12c0b8
Add CI that builds and runs every example (#598)
* Regenerate the CRL that expired in September 2025

* Refresh the expired certificates embedded in certloadverifybuffer

* Return 0 from tls servers that returned a wolfSSL_write byte count

* Send a client certificate from client-tls and client-tls13-resume

* Return 0 from certverify instead of WOLFSSL_SUCCESS

* Give the XTS demo key two different halves

* Exit success after ml_dsa prints its parameter table

* Report failure from the custom io file client and server

* Latch failures across every ecc-params curve lookup

* Ignore SIGPIPE in the btle fifo transport

* Fix the dtls rw-threads certificate paths

* Make runall.sh fail when an example fails

* Make openssl-verify.sh actually verify and actually fail

* Raise the generate_ssl.sh common name length limit

* Port the PQ examples to the current wolfSSL API

* Return 0 from csr_w_ed25519_example and rsa-public-decrypt-app

* Build the x509_acert openssl example against the right headers

* Give the examples Makefiles a consistent wolfSSL prefix

* Fix the double free and NULL derefs in the custom io cleanup paths

* Stop forcing the ESP32 examples to include a developer private config

* Add the missing WiFi Kconfig to the DTLS13 station examples

* Use XSTRLCPY in client-dtls13 since wolfSSL has no XSTRCPY

* Make the DTLS13 example ctx static so it stops colliding with libnet80211

* Set SO_REUSEADDR on the tls servers that lacked it

* Give puf the wolfSSL sources and stop building the IDF 4.4 only ENC28J60 examples

* Set SO_REUSEADDR on server-tcp as well

* Exit the can-bus client on EOF and give it real input in CI

* Re-arm the select timeout each pass in the nonblocking dtls server

* Keep the shared memory BIOs alive until both sides are done

* Port the ebpf tracers to the libbpf 1.0 perf_buffer__new signature

* Clone wolfSSL before make builds its graph so uefi-static builds from a clean tree

* Raise wolfcryptjni compileSdk to 32 for the BigInteger API its submodule uses

* Link wolfentropy.o and keep wc_port socket helpers out of the UEFI build

* Track the wolfSSL dilithium.c to wc_mldsa.c rename and drop a stale java import

* Move uefi-library to the wc_MlDsa API after the wolfSSL dilithium rename

* Declare the launcher activity exported, required from API 31

* Configure wolfSSL before make in the fullstack setup script

* Track the wolfSSL io.c to wolfio.c rename in the ndk sample

* Keep glibc headers out of the freestanding uefi-library build

* Track the wolfSSL mlkem.h rename and give RT1060 the SDK name it selects on

* Track the wolfIP struct ll rename and pin wolfIP to its v1.0 release

* Use getaddrinfo in the ndk sample since bionic does not declare gethostbyname

* Cross compile RT1060 with arm-none-eabi and document the SDK value the Makefile matches

* Enable wolfIP HTTP so its httpd.h actually declares the API the example calls

* Define HAVE_NETDB_H so wolfio.c includes the header its getaddrinfo path needs

* Link pkcs12.o, which RT1060 enables by default and wolfcrypt test calls

* Port the ENC28J60 examples to the ESP-IDF 5.x ethernet API

* Compile dtls.c in the ndk sample, which enables WOLFSSL_DTLS

* Define the PHY identifier registers the removed IDF header supplied

* Compile kdf.c in the ndk sample for the TLS PRF

* Give RT1060 a current_time so the benchmark stops needing clock_gettime

* Port the ENC28J60 PHY to the IDF 5.x autonego_ctrl vtable

* Remove the ENC28J60 server's duplicate driver copy that main already builds

* Return the DTLS server to accept on close_notify so a resume is heard

* Run the C# pq client/server pair under mono

* Define WOLFSSL_CERT_REQ so the ndk-gradle app links wolfssljni's X509_REQ calls

* Refresh the expired client ECC DER certificate

* Add CI that builds and runs every example against wolfSSL master and stable

* Sign OCSP staples with a responder intermediate1 actually delegated

* Report a failing PKCS#11 example instead of always exiting 0

* Link the PSA library the README's PSA_LIB_PATH names

* Widen the mynewt pointer prints so they build on a 64 bit native BSP

* Test RSA under UEFI with a 2048 bit key so it clears wolfSSL's minimum

* Left pad the ECDSA r and s so a leading zero cannot shift the signature

* Document the smime and indef flags the pkcs7 examples need

* Fail ecc-verify when the signature does not verify

* Fail ecc-sign when a round produces an invalid signature

* Fail aesgcm-file-encrypt when its sanity test does not pass

* Check that ML-KEM derives the same shared secret on both sides

* Fail ecdh_gen_secret when the two sides derive different secrets

* Return the DH key agreement error instead of always exiting 0

* Retry the fullstack HTTPS probe so a slow sim start does not fail it

* Confirm the custom-io file transfer succeeded so CI can assert it

* Print a success line from the silent file-encrypt and ecc-export examples

* Add device-sims job running ATECC608 STSAFE and TROPIC01 sim wolfcrypt tests

* Extend device-sims to STM32 and PIC32MZ for the full sim fleet

* Mount wolfSSL for the STM32 and PIC32MZ sim wolfcrypt runs

* Accept the zero success return from wolfSSL_CTX_set_max_early_data

* Read the earlydata reply so the client processes the session ticket before resuming

* Read the earlydata reply in the DTLS client so it processes the session ticket

* Run the tls13 and dtls13 earlydata pairs now that the clients process the ticket

* Let expect_fail clear on refs that carry the fix via a fixed_on marker

* Retry the PSA TLS 1.3 handshake so an intermittent ECC reject does not fail CI

* Retry network fetches across CI so a transient blip does not fail a job

* Normalize do_ecc and do_25519 exit codes like do_448 so an error is never masked to 0

* Build and run the merged-in hsm dtls_client example in CI via a dedicated hsm.yml job

* Add a make check target to each applicable example

* Run only the example and lint smoke set on draft PRs

* Only run a per-target workflow when its own example dir changes

* Assert the real se050 wolfcrypt result instead of an early sub-test line

* Size the RSA 2048 key export buffers so the UEFI test does not fail on BUFFER_E

* Call the always-present MLDSA context API from the UEFI driver

* Cross uefi-static and uefi-library with both wolfSSL refs in the matrix

* Give each tpm matrix leg a ref-unique results file and artifact

* Add a codespell spellcheck pass to the lint job

* Run push CI on master only so a PR branch does not double-trigger

* Select valgrind by caller_run_id since event_name is the caller under workflow_call

* Make example check targets catch real failures with pipefail exit checks and inputs

* Wire the harness to run make check for mode check examples starting with ecc

* Migrate the single-entry exec examples to mode check and fold their inputs into the check targets

* Fix four make check assertions that misfired under pipefail

* Give the tpm manifest entry a run step so it asserts output

* Skip uefi-static in the lint make -n loop so it does not clone

* Assert the actual verify result in the pkcs7 and rsa-nb checks

* Return nonzero from pkcs12-create-example on a failed create so the check is not a false pass

* Return nonzero from rsa-kg on any key generate or write failure

* Assert the static memory checks by exit code instead of a pipefail grep that BSD make lacks

* Run pkcs7 signedData stream through make check so it asserts the real verify result

* Check DER certificates and CRLs in the expiry canary too

* Feed the wolfHSM client its stdin so run_client actually exchanges data

* Assert every make check by exit code and captured output instead of a pipefail grep so they hold under BSD make
2026-07-23 10:07:06 -06:00
..
.gitignore Add eBPF examples 2025-12-24 12:10:15 +02:00
Makefile Add eBPF examples 2025-12-24 12:10:15 +02:00
README.md Add eBPF examples 2025-12-24 12:10:15 +02:00
client-tcp.c Add eBPF examples 2025-12-24 12:10:15 +02:00
server-tcp.c Add eBPF examples 2025-12-24 12:10:15 +02:00
write_tracer.bpf.c Add eBPF examples 2025-12-24 12:10:15 +02:00
write_tracer.c Add CI that builds and runs every example (#598) 2026-07-23 10:07:06 -06:00

README.md

syscall-write-trace

eBPF Example: Tracing Plaintext at the write() Syscall Boundary

This example demonstrates how to use Linux eBPF to intercept the write() system call and extract plaintext data before the kernel performs any buffering, encryption, or processing. It uses a simple TCP client/server pair to generate predictable network writes and an eBPF tracepoint program to observe them.

This example is part of the wolfSSL eBPF observability suite, designed to help developers understand how plaintext flows through the system and how eBPF can be used to debug, monitor, or study application behavior without modifying application code.


📌 Problem

When debugging network applications, especially TLS applications, developers often want to inspect:

  • What plaintext is being written
  • What data is being sent to the network
  • Whether buffers contain what we expect
  • Whether the application or kernel is modifying data
  • Whether the problem is at the app layer, kernel layer, or crypto layer

However, once an application calls:

write(fd, buffer, count)

the kernel:

  • does not expose the plaintext
  • may buffer or coalesce writes
  • may encrypt data (TLS offload, QUIC, etc.)
  • hides memory from tools
  • provides no visibility into the user buffer

Traditional debugging tools (tcpdump, Wireshark, strace) cannot see the plaintext before encryption or kernel processing.

This creates a visibility gap.


🎯 Solution

We attach an eBPF tracepoint to:

tracepoint/syscalls/sys_enter_write

This gives us:

  • access to the syscall arguments
  • the calling processs PID/TID
  • the file descriptor
  • the byte count
  • the raw user pointer to the data
  • ability to read the plaintext with bpf_probe_read_user()

The eBPF program:

  1. Filters events only from a target process (client-tcp)
  2. Copies up to 255 bytes of user-space buffer safely
  3. Sends them to user-space via a perf buffer
  4. The userspace loader prints ASCII and hex output

This provides perfect visibility into the plaintext leaving the application.


🧩 Architecture

   TCP Client App (user space)
         |
         | 1. call write(fd, buf, count)
         v
 ┌──────────────────────────────┐
 │ tracepoint: sys_enter_write  │  ← eBPF hook runs BEFORE write executes
 │ eBPF program:                │
 │  - filters process name       │
 │  - reads buffer from user mem │
 │  - emits event via perf buf   │
 └───────────────┬──────────────┘
                 |
                 | 2. event (plaintext)
                 v
        Userspace Loader (write_tracer)
        --------------------------------
        - loads BPF program
        - attaches tracepoint
        - opens perf buffer
        - prints plaintext
                 |
                 | 3. human-readable output
                 v
              Terminal

🔍 Detailed Walkthrough

1. The Sample Applications

server-tcp.c

A simple TCP echo server on port 11111:

  • waits for a connection
  • receives a message
  • prints it
  • echoes back a canned response
  • loops

client-tcp.c

A matching TCP client:

  • prompts user for input
  • writes it to the server
  • prints server response

These programs provide predictable write() calls for tracing.


2. The eBPF Program: write_tracer.bpf.c

Hooks:

tracepoint/syscalls/sys_enter_write

Key details:

✔ Event Filtering

Checks the process name (comm) to avoid tracing all processes.

✔ Safe Memory Access

Uses:

bpf_probe_read_user()

to copy user memory safely, limited to 255 bytes (verifier-friendly bound).

✔ Perf Buffer Emission

Writes events to a ring buffer consumed by user-space.

✔ Struct of event data

Contains:

  • PID, TID
  • FD
  • count
  • process name
  • captured data

3. The Userspace Loader: write_tracer.c

It:

  1. Raises RLIMIT_MEMLOCK
  2. Loads write_tracer.bpf.o
  3. Attaches the tracepoint
  4. Opens perf buffer
  5. Pretty-prints events:
=== WRITE SYSCALL INTERCEPTED ===
Process: client-tcp (PID: 1234)
FD: 3
Count: 13 bytes
Data: "hello world!"
Hex: 68 65 6c ...

This gives full plaintext visibility.


🚀 How to Build

Dependencies (Ubuntu):

sudo apt install clang llvm libbpf-dev libelf-dev zlib1g-dev build-essential

Then:

make

This compiles:

  • TCP client/server
  • eBPF program (write_tracer.bpf.o)
  • userspace loader (write_tracer)

▶️ How to Run

1. Terminal #1 — Start the tracer

sudo ./write_tracer

2. Terminal #2 — Start the TCP server

./server-tcp

3. Terminal #3 — Run client and type message

./client-tcp 127.0.0.1

Tracer output:

=== WRITE SYSCALL INTERCEPTED ===
Process: client-tcp
File Descriptor: 3
Write Count: 13 bytes
Data (first 13 bytes): hello world!

🎁 Benefits of This Example

✔ Shows how to read plaintext before kernel/network/TLS processing

✔ Demonstrates safe buffer access in eBPF

✔ Demonstrates filtering (PID, process name)

✔ Teaches core eBPF concepts: tracepoints, perf buffers, verifier constraints

✔ Foundation for more advanced examples (TLS plaintext, handshake tracing)

✔ Helps wolfSSL developers debug TLS behavior

✔ Useful for application developers integrating wolfSSL


⚙️ Nitty-Gritty Details

1. Why tracepoint instead of kprobe?

Tracepoints are:

  • stable
  • argument offsets fixed
  • preferred for syscall entry tracing

Allows verifier to analyze program more easily.

2. Why use process name filtering?

Without it, the tracer prints:

  • output from bash
  • systemd
  • everything reading/writing

Filtering avoids noise.

3. Why limit buffer to 255 bytes?

Verifier restrictions require fixed bounded copy sizes. A 255-byte buffer is safe and sufficient for demos.

4. Why use perf buffer instead of ringbuf?

Perf buffer is more compatible with older kernels (e.g., Ubuntu LTS). Perfect for examples.

5. Why use simple TCP client/server?

Consistent, predictable write() calls make tracing easy to demo.