wolfssl-examples/ebpf/syscall-write-trace/README.md

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syscall-write-trace

eBPF Example: Tracing Plaintext at the write() Syscall Boundary

This example demonstrates how to use Linux eBPF to intercept the write() system call and extract plaintext data before the kernel performs any buffering, encryption, or processing. It uses a simple TCP client/server pair to generate predictable network writes and an eBPF tracepoint program to observe them.

This example is part of the wolfSSL eBPF observability suite, designed to help developers understand how plaintext flows through the system and how eBPF can be used to debug, monitor, or study application behavior without modifying application code.


📌 Problem

When debugging network applications, especially TLS applications, developers often want to inspect:

  • What plaintext is being written
  • What data is being sent to the network
  • Whether buffers contain what we expect
  • Whether the application or kernel is modifying data
  • Whether the problem is at the app layer, kernel layer, or crypto layer

However, once an application calls:

write(fd, buffer, count)

the kernel:

  • does not expose the plaintext
  • may buffer or coalesce writes
  • may encrypt data (TLS offload, QUIC, etc.)
  • hides memory from tools
  • provides no visibility into the user buffer

Traditional debugging tools (tcpdump, Wireshark, strace) cannot see the plaintext before encryption or kernel processing.

This creates a visibility gap.


🎯 Solution

We attach an eBPF tracepoint to:

tracepoint/syscalls/sys_enter_write

This gives us:

  • access to the syscall arguments
  • the calling processs PID/TID
  • the file descriptor
  • the byte count
  • the raw user pointer to the data
  • ability to read the plaintext with bpf_probe_read_user()

The eBPF program:

  1. Filters events only from a target process (client-tcp)
  2. Copies up to 255 bytes of user-space buffer safely
  3. Sends them to user-space via a perf buffer
  4. The userspace loader prints ASCII and hex output

This provides perfect visibility into the plaintext leaving the application.


🧩 Architecture

   TCP Client App (user space)
         |
         | 1. call write(fd, buf, count)
         v
 ┌──────────────────────────────┐
 │ tracepoint: sys_enter_write  │  ← eBPF hook runs BEFORE write executes
 │ eBPF program:                │
 │  - filters process name       │
 │  - reads buffer from user mem │
 │  - emits event via perf buf   │
 └───────────────┬──────────────┘
                 |
                 | 2. event (plaintext)
                 v
        Userspace Loader (write_tracer)
        --------------------------------
        - loads BPF program
        - attaches tracepoint
        - opens perf buffer
        - prints plaintext
                 |
                 | 3. human-readable output
                 v
              Terminal

🔍 Detailed Walkthrough

1. The Sample Applications

server-tcp.c

A simple TCP echo server on port 11111:

  • waits for a connection
  • receives a message
  • prints it
  • echoes back a canned response
  • loops

client-tcp.c

A matching TCP client:

  • prompts user for input
  • writes it to the server
  • prints server response

These programs provide predictable write() calls for tracing.


2. The eBPF Program: write_tracer.bpf.c

Hooks:

tracepoint/syscalls/sys_enter_write

Key details:

✔ Event Filtering

Checks the process name (comm) to avoid tracing all processes.

✔ Safe Memory Access

Uses:

bpf_probe_read_user()

to copy user memory safely, limited to 255 bytes (verifier-friendly bound).

✔ Perf Buffer Emission

Writes events to a ring buffer consumed by user-space.

✔ Struct of event data

Contains:

  • PID, TID
  • FD
  • count
  • process name
  • captured data

3. The Userspace Loader: write_tracer.c

It:

  1. Raises RLIMIT_MEMLOCK
  2. Loads write_tracer.bpf.o
  3. Attaches the tracepoint
  4. Opens perf buffer
  5. Pretty-prints events:
=== WRITE SYSCALL INTERCEPTED ===
Process: client-tcp (PID: 1234)
FD: 3
Count: 13 bytes
Data: "hello world!"
Hex: 68 65 6c ...

This gives full plaintext visibility.


🚀 How to Build

Dependencies (Ubuntu):

sudo apt install clang llvm libbpf-dev libelf-dev zlib1g-dev build-essential

Then:

make

This compiles:

  • TCP client/server
  • eBPF program (write_tracer.bpf.o)
  • userspace loader (write_tracer)

▶️ How to Run

1. Terminal #1 — Start the tracer

sudo ./write_tracer

2. Terminal #2 — Start the TCP server

./server-tcp

3. Terminal #3 — Run client and type message

./client-tcp 127.0.0.1

Tracer output:

=== WRITE SYSCALL INTERCEPTED ===
Process: client-tcp
File Descriptor: 3
Write Count: 13 bytes
Data (first 13 bytes): hello world!

🎁 Benefits of This Example

✔ Shows how to read plaintext before kernel/network/TLS processing

✔ Demonstrates safe buffer access in eBPF

✔ Demonstrates filtering (PID, process name)

✔ Teaches core eBPF concepts: tracepoints, perf buffers, verifier constraints

✔ Foundation for more advanced examples (TLS plaintext, handshake tracing)

✔ Helps wolfSSL developers debug TLS behavior

✔ Useful for application developers integrating wolfSSL


⚙️ Nitty-Gritty Details

1. Why tracepoint instead of kprobe?

Tracepoints are:

  • stable
  • argument offsets fixed
  • preferred for syscall entry tracing

Allows verifier to analyze program more easily.

2. Why use process name filtering?

Without it, the tracer prints:

  • output from bash
  • systemd
  • everything reading/writing

Filtering avoids noise.

3. Why limit buffer to 255 bytes?

Verifier restrictions require fixed bounded copy sizes. A 255-byte buffer is safe and sufficient for demos.

4. Why use perf buffer instead of ringbuf?

Perf buffer is more compatible with older kernels (e.g., Ubuntu LTS). Perfect for examples.

5. Why use simple TCP client/server?

Consistent, predictable write() calls make tracing easy to demo.