wolfBoot ships as source. Users build it in many ways. Before this
change, only the plain Make build could make an SBOM. So a user could not
make an SBOM for the build that the user runs.
This change adds one shared engine (tools/scripts/wolfboot-sbom.sh, which
calls wolfSSL gen-sbom) and a front end for each build system. Every
build makes a CycloneDX 1.6 and SPDX 2.3 document. The engine captures
the configuration with the host compiler, so the SBOM is the same for
GCC, Clang, LLVM, IAR, armcl, CCRX, and XC32.
Routes:
- Make, arch.mk, and vendor SDKs: make sbom TARGET=<t> SIGN=<a>
- CMake and the Pico SDK: cmake --build <dir> --target sbom
- IAR Embedded Workbench: ide-sbom/iar_sbom.py
- Any IDE with a compilation database: ide-sbom/compdb_sbom.py
- TI CCS, MPLAB X, Renesas, Xilinx: ide-sbom/route_through_sbom.sh
- Per-HAL component: make sbom-hal TARGET=<t>
- Zephyr module: ide-sbom/zephyr_sbom.py
Make the SBOM reproducible. The captured macros can hold an absolute host
path. For example, arch.mk passes -DPICO_SDK_PATH=$(PICO_SDK_PATH). The
driver now redacts each absolute path but keeps the macro name, so the
configuration record stays complete. Add --no-scrub for debug.
Add a validator (ide-sbom/validate_sbom.py) and a CI canary
(.github/workflows/test-sbom.yml) that runs and validates every route.
The canary also checks that no host path leaks into the SBOM.
Add docs/SBOM.md. The tools are product-neutral by design, so they can be
shared across wolfSSL products later without logic changes.
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
Run wolfBoot on the PIC32CZ CA9x host core (Cortex-M7) as a wolfHSM client,
offloading the image digest (SHA-256) and the ECDSA P-256 signature check to
the wolfHSM server.
Four fixes needed by any wolfHSM client
- include/user_settings.h emitted "typedef struct WC_RNG WC_RNG;" whenever
WOLF_CRYPTO_CB && WC_NO_RNG, with no __ASSEMBLER__ guard, so a client built
with ARM thumb2 assembly failed to assemble wolfSSL's .S sources. Guard it.
- options.mk hardcoded WOLFHSM_CFG_COMM_DATA_LEN=5000 for every client. Make
it a variable (default unchanged) so ports whose transport slot is smaller
can override it.
- options.mk gated DEBUG_UART on the existence of the driver *object*, which
never exists on a clean tree, so DEBUG_UART was dropped on the very build
meant to enable it. Test for the source instead.
- Makefile unconditionally built an NVM key image with whnvmtool for
WOLFHSM_CLIENT=1. Add WOLFHSM_NVM_IMAGE=0 for ports that install the
verification key at boot instead.
The sbom target fed `cc -dM -E` an empty /dev/null with only
WOLFSSL_USER_SETTINGS, so gen-sbom's build properties collapsed to host
compiler builtins (all filtered out as noise) and the SBOM did not reflect
the selected configuration. Harvest the actual -D config macros from CFLAGS
(filtered in the shell so defines whose values contain spaces, e.g.
BOOTLOADER_PARTITION_SIZE=$((...)), survive intact) so the SBOM captures the
real TARGET/SIGN/HASH/feature set.
Also:
- add preflight checks for empty WOLFBOOT_VERSION and missing GEN_SBOM
- pass sources via --srcs-file to avoid ARG_MAX on large configs
- include .S sources in the source set, not just .c
- make HOSTCC and GEN_SBOM overridable
- README: soften "CRA Compliance" wording, use wolfboot-<version>.* names,
fix dangling wolfssl/doc/CRA.md link to point at the wolfSSL CRA Kit
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh.j@gmail.com>
Adds sbom target that produces CycloneDX and SPDX
SBOM files for a specific TARGET+SIGN combination.
Sources extracted from OBJS variable via wildcard.
wolfcrypt sources compiled into wolfBoot are listed
as wolfBoot's own sources (not a separate component).
Requires GEN_SBOM or WOLFBOOT_LIB_WOLFSSL set.
Wires the new wolfBoot_gunzip inflater into the FIT image-loading path
and adds initramfs (ramdisk) extraction with DTB /chosen fixup so a
single signed FIT can carry kernel, DTB, and rootfs.
GZIP path
---------
* fit_load_image_ex(out_max) added; fit_load_image kept as a wrapper.
* When a subimage carries compression="gzip", inflate straight to the
FIT-declared load address, then verify the FIT hash-1 subnode
(sha256 / sha384 if available) for defense in depth on top of the
outer wolfBoot signature. The compression property is now read
unconditionally so a build without WOLFBOOT_GZIP can warn and fail
closed instead of silently memcpy-ing compressed bytes as if they
were raw.
* fit_verify_hash propagates wc_InitSha256 / wc_Sha256Update /
wc_Sha256Final return codes (and the SHA-384 equivalents) - any
non-zero return is treated as a verification failure so a misbehaving
backend cannot silently degrade to a no-op.
* GZIP=1 is the new default in the FIT-using example configs (zynqmp,
zynqmp_sdcard, polarfire_mpfs250, polarfire_mpfs250_qspi,
versal_vmk180, versal_vmk180_sdcard); set GZIP=0 to opt out.
Ramdisk path
------------
* fit_find_images() gains a ramdisk out-arg and fdt_fixup_initrd()
writes /chosen/linux,initrd-{start,end} as 64-bit big-endian cells.
* update_disk.c and update_ram.c load the FIT ramdisk node (under
WOLFBOOT_FIT_RAMDISK) and patch the loaded DTB. Compressed (gzip)
ramdisks reuse the same fit_load_image_ex() decompress path.
* RAMDISK=1 build switch defines WOLFBOOT_FIT_RAMDISK;
WOLFBOOT_LOAD_RAMDISK_ADDRESS is plumbed through tools/config.mk ->
Makefile sed -> include/target.h.in. Defaults to 0; when 0 the
ramdisk stays at whatever fit_load_image returned.
* hal/zynq.c and hal/versal.c bump fdt_totalsize headroom from 512 to
768 bytes to fit the new linux,initrd-{start,end} entries.
* config/examples/zynqmp_sdcard.config gains a commented-out opt-in
block (RAMDISK=1, WOLFBOOT_LOAD_RAMDISK_ADDRESS=0x40000000, alt
LINUX_BOOTARGS) so a single config file covers both rootfs-on-disk
and FIT-bundled-initramfs flows.
Builds against the existing master configs are byte-identical when
GZIP=0 and RAMDISK is unset.
Adds support for running wolfBoot in **Machine Mode (M-mode)** on the PolarFire SoC MPFS250T, booting from eNVM and loading a signed application from **SC QSPI flash** into on-chip LIM (Loosely Integrated Memory). No HSS (Hart Software Services) or DDR is required. It also extends the existing PolarFire HAL with multi-hart support, L2 cache configuration, per-hart UART, and refactors shared code (SDHCI, SCB mailbox, linker/test-app) for both S-mode and M-mode builds.
Sameeh Jubran
Brett Nicholas
David Garske
Aidan Garske
Mattia Moffa
Marco Oliverio
Sameeh Jubran
Mark Atwood
aidan garske
Alex Lanzano
Daniele Lacamera