One KEM encapsulation protecting an ordered message sequence via
wc_HpkeInitSealContext()/wc_HpkeContextSealBase() and the open
equivalents, with out-of-order rejection.
wolfCrypt-level ShangMi examples: SM3 hash (GB/T 32905 known answer),
SM4-GCM with tamper detection, SM2 sign/verify including the ZA digest
step, and SM2 ECDH. Requires the wolfSSL/wolfsm overlay.
* Regenerate the CRL that expired in September 2025
* Refresh the expired certificates embedded in certloadverifybuffer
* Return 0 from tls servers that returned a wolfSSL_write byte count
* Send a client certificate from client-tls and client-tls13-resume
* Return 0 from certverify instead of WOLFSSL_SUCCESS
* Give the XTS demo key two different halves
* Exit success after ml_dsa prints its parameter table
* Report failure from the custom io file client and server
* Latch failures across every ecc-params curve lookup
* Ignore SIGPIPE in the btle fifo transport
* Fix the dtls rw-threads certificate paths
* Make runall.sh fail when an example fails
* Make openssl-verify.sh actually verify and actually fail
* Raise the generate_ssl.sh common name length limit
* Port the PQ examples to the current wolfSSL API
* Return 0 from csr_w_ed25519_example and rsa-public-decrypt-app
* Build the x509_acert openssl example against the right headers
* Give the examples Makefiles a consistent wolfSSL prefix
* Fix the double free and NULL derefs in the custom io cleanup paths
* Stop forcing the ESP32 examples to include a developer private config
* Add the missing WiFi Kconfig to the DTLS13 station examples
* Use XSTRLCPY in client-dtls13 since wolfSSL has no XSTRCPY
* Make the DTLS13 example ctx static so it stops colliding with libnet80211
* Set SO_REUSEADDR on the tls servers that lacked it
* Give puf the wolfSSL sources and stop building the IDF 4.4 only ENC28J60 examples
* Set SO_REUSEADDR on server-tcp as well
* Exit the can-bus client on EOF and give it real input in CI
* Re-arm the select timeout each pass in the nonblocking dtls server
* Keep the shared memory BIOs alive until both sides are done
* Port the ebpf tracers to the libbpf 1.0 perf_buffer__new signature
* Clone wolfSSL before make builds its graph so uefi-static builds from a clean tree
* Raise wolfcryptjni compileSdk to 32 for the BigInteger API its submodule uses
* Link wolfentropy.o and keep wc_port socket helpers out of the UEFI build
* Track the wolfSSL dilithium.c to wc_mldsa.c rename and drop a stale java import
* Move uefi-library to the wc_MlDsa API after the wolfSSL dilithium rename
* Declare the launcher activity exported, required from API 31
* Configure wolfSSL before make in the fullstack setup script
* Track the wolfSSL io.c to wolfio.c rename in the ndk sample
* Keep glibc headers out of the freestanding uefi-library build
* Track the wolfSSL mlkem.h rename and give RT1060 the SDK name it selects on
* Track the wolfIP struct ll rename and pin wolfIP to its v1.0 release
* Use getaddrinfo in the ndk sample since bionic does not declare gethostbyname
* Cross compile RT1060 with arm-none-eabi and document the SDK value the Makefile matches
* Enable wolfIP HTTP so its httpd.h actually declares the API the example calls
* Define HAVE_NETDB_H so wolfio.c includes the header its getaddrinfo path needs
* Link pkcs12.o, which RT1060 enables by default and wolfcrypt test calls
* Port the ENC28J60 examples to the ESP-IDF 5.x ethernet API
* Compile dtls.c in the ndk sample, which enables WOLFSSL_DTLS
* Define the PHY identifier registers the removed IDF header supplied
* Compile kdf.c in the ndk sample for the TLS PRF
* Give RT1060 a current_time so the benchmark stops needing clock_gettime
* Port the ENC28J60 PHY to the IDF 5.x autonego_ctrl vtable
* Remove the ENC28J60 server's duplicate driver copy that main already builds
* Return the DTLS server to accept on close_notify so a resume is heard
* Run the C# pq client/server pair under mono
* Define WOLFSSL_CERT_REQ so the ndk-gradle app links wolfssljni's X509_REQ calls
* Refresh the expired client ECC DER certificate
* Add CI that builds and runs every example against wolfSSL master and stable
* Sign OCSP staples with a responder intermediate1 actually delegated
* Report a failing PKCS#11 example instead of always exiting 0
* Link the PSA library the README's PSA_LIB_PATH names
* Widen the mynewt pointer prints so they build on a 64 bit native BSP
* Test RSA under UEFI with a 2048 bit key so it clears wolfSSL's minimum
* Left pad the ECDSA r and s so a leading zero cannot shift the signature
* Document the smime and indef flags the pkcs7 examples need
* Fail ecc-verify when the signature does not verify
* Fail ecc-sign when a round produces an invalid signature
* Fail aesgcm-file-encrypt when its sanity test does not pass
* Check that ML-KEM derives the same shared secret on both sides
* Fail ecdh_gen_secret when the two sides derive different secrets
* Return the DH key agreement error instead of always exiting 0
* Retry the fullstack HTTPS probe so a slow sim start does not fail it
* Confirm the custom-io file transfer succeeded so CI can assert it
* Print a success line from the silent file-encrypt and ecc-export examples
* Add device-sims job running ATECC608 STSAFE and TROPIC01 sim wolfcrypt tests
* Extend device-sims to STM32 and PIC32MZ for the full sim fleet
* Mount wolfSSL for the STM32 and PIC32MZ sim wolfcrypt runs
* Accept the zero success return from wolfSSL_CTX_set_max_early_data
* Read the earlydata reply so the client processes the session ticket before resuming
* Read the earlydata reply in the DTLS client so it processes the session ticket
* Run the tls13 and dtls13 earlydata pairs now that the clients process the ticket
* Let expect_fail clear on refs that carry the fix via a fixed_on marker
* Retry the PSA TLS 1.3 handshake so an intermittent ECC reject does not fail CI
* Retry network fetches across CI so a transient blip does not fail a job
* Normalize do_ecc and do_25519 exit codes like do_448 so an error is never masked to 0
* Build and run the merged-in hsm dtls_client example in CI via a dedicated hsm.yml job
* Add a make check target to each applicable example
* Run only the example and lint smoke set on draft PRs
* Only run a per-target workflow when its own example dir changes
* Assert the real se050 wolfcrypt result instead of an early sub-test line
* Size the RSA 2048 key export buffers so the UEFI test does not fail on BUFFER_E
* Call the always-present MLDSA context API from the UEFI driver
* Cross uefi-static and uefi-library with both wolfSSL refs in the matrix
* Give each tpm matrix leg a ref-unique results file and artifact
* Add a codespell spellcheck pass to the lint job
* Run push CI on master only so a PR branch does not double-trigger
* Select valgrind by caller_run_id since event_name is the caller under workflow_call
* Make example check targets catch real failures with pipefail exit checks and inputs
* Wire the harness to run make check for mode check examples starting with ecc
* Migrate the single-entry exec examples to mode check and fold their inputs into the check targets
* Fix four make check assertions that misfired under pipefail
* Give the tpm manifest entry a run step so it asserts output
* Skip uefi-static in the lint make -n loop so it does not clone
* Assert the actual verify result in the pkcs7 and rsa-nb checks
* Return nonzero from pkcs12-create-example on a failed create so the check is not a false pass
* Return nonzero from rsa-kg on any key generate or write failure
* Assert the static memory checks by exit code instead of a pipefail grep that BSD make lacks
* Run pkcs7 signedData stream through make check so it asserts the real verify result
* Check DER certificates and CRLs in the expiry canary too
* Feed the wolfHSM client its stdin so run_client actually exchanges data
* Assert every make check by exit code and captured output instead of a pipefail grep so they hold under BSD make
Provision the wrapped scalar with AES-GCM (iv + tag) instead of ECB, so a
tampered/corrupted/wrong-device blob fails at unwrap (AES_GCM_AUTH_E) rather than
yielding a garbage scalar. Matches the wc_Rtl8735b_EccKey iv/tag fields.
The HUK HMAC accumulation buffer now lives on the inner SHA-256 devCtx and relies
on the cryptocb copy/free ops so wc_HmacCopy/wc_HmacFree manage it correctly.
In-memory TLS 1.2 ECDHE-ECDSA handshake with the server certificate ECDSA P-256
signature produced on the HUK HW engine via a PK sign callback. The rest of TLS
(PRF/HMAC, record AES-GCM, ECDHE) stays in software: a whole-CTX WC_HUK_DEVID
would route TLS's own 32-byte HMAC keys (e.g. the P-256 ECDHE pre-master in the
PRF) to the HUK, whose key==seed semantics break key derivation. Validated on
RTL8735B silicon.
- Replace fabricated library-binary SHA-256/SHA-1 with all-zeros sentinels
in the pinned wolfssl-component samples (cdx/spdx + commercial variants);
a non-reproducible binary hash must not ship in a copyable sample.
- Recompute product bom-link checksums (CycloneDX bom hash + SPDX
externalDocumentRef) to match the edited component SBOMs.
- Give the SPDX tag-value document a distinct documentNamespace so it no
longer collides with the JSON serialization (SPDX 2.3 sec 3.5).
- Add licenses (GPL-3.0-only) to the wolfssl component in the product CDX
(NTIA minimum elements).
- Align conformity-assessment-route.md wording to Annex III "important" /
Annex IV "critical", dropping the "class II" label.
- Document the sentinel digest in SAMPLE-PROVENANCE.md.
validate.sh passes (cross-document checksums + pyspdxtools schema).
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
Anthony
Aidan Garske
Marco Oliverio
Emma Stensland
Paul Adelsbach
Emma Stensland
jackctj117
JacobBarthelmeh
Paul Adelsbach
Zackery
David Garske
Sameeh Jubran