- internal flash now mapped at 0xC0000000 (using `ARCH_FLASH_OFFSET`)
- wolfBoot binary included in internal flash (wolfboot partition is also
now writeable to test self-updates and encryption)
- sim test app supports encryption (sets the key for test)
- added new target to store the update in the external flash
- external flash mapped to 0xD0000000
fix a key not being unloaded, normaly doesn't crop up since in normal circumstances wolfBoot and the TPM both turn on fresh but on the simulator not freeing the key caseus a leak
```
wolfBoot HAL Init
Flash Init: Ret 0, ID 0x76207620
Part: Active 0, Address 0
Boot partition: 200000
Image size 3964
Firmware Valid
Loading 3964 bytes to RAM at 1E000000
Booting at 1E000000
```
move pcr reset and extend outside of session
the tpm uses policy checking for modifying PCR's so we need to reset and extend the PCR's with the image hash before the session begins, currently tested unseal, having trouble getting the simulator to run update in order to test reseal
powerfail and add an exception to wolfBoot_delta_update when a revert gets
interrupted since the version will change in the middle of the update process
0th sector has been changed with the update partition still being in
IMG_STATE_UPDATING state. the state still being IMG_STATE_UPDATING means that a
delta update started and that the version may have been switched over, in which
case wolfBoot_current_firmware_version() >= wolfBoot_update_firmware_version()
no longer tells us if we need to perform an inverse operation on it's own.
also removes part of the update powerfail test that does checks for the
previous version without triggering a rollback
* Fixes for e500 L1/L2 cache.
* Fixes for eLBC and DDR3 drivers on P1021.
* Fixes for LAW and TLB for P1021.
* Fix for the e500v2 core peripheral issues with data barrier / coherency safety.
* Support for SP math all (`SPMATHALL=1`).
* Support for stage 1 loader (`make stage1`).
this update uses the tpm to retreive the public key used to validate the image that will boot and restricts access to that key by tpm policy. when the image is updated it's signature is used to extend the PCR and when the image is loaded it's signature must match what was sealed in order to get the public key from the tpm. enabling this option is done by setting WOLFBOOT_TPM_KEYSTORE in .config